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INTRODUCTION
THE AUFBAU AND THE GERMAN -JEWISH CLUB

The Early Years

The German- Jewish newspaper AUFBAU- RECONSTRUCTION was the largest,

most long lived and influential newspaper of the German- speaking emigration
to the United States in the Nazi era.
as a newsletter

From its humble origin in the 1930s

of the German- Jewish Club of New York City, it

developed remarkably into the most important emigre publication during

World War II.
Unlike many papers of the German literary and political exile, the

AUFBAU did not start in the mid-thirties as an antifascist paper with
illustrious names on its editorial board.
was not even

a

On the contrary the AUFBAU

refugee paper when it first appeared in 1934 and for

year it remained sufficiently obscure to slip through Nazi customs.

a
2

In its early years it was merely a twelve page newsletter of the German-

Jewish Club in New York City, sent free of charge to all members every

^Another important paper edited and read by refugees was Neue
Volks-Zeitung (NVZ) , 1932-1948, a sequel of the Volkszeitung a Social
Democratic weekly originally published by German -American Social Democrats
In the thirties and forties the NVZ was edited by Gerhard
(1888-1928)
well
Seger and other exiled Social Democrats and read by many refugees as
(1937-1938)
Volkesecho
socialists.
as by the old time German -American
of the communist
and The German American (1942-1949) were the publications
group in
emigre
communist
emigration in the United States. The main
there
eutschland
D
America was in Mexico City and published the Freies
(the
Czechoslovakia
Other centers of exile journalism were
(1941-1945)
1939)
until
there
Social Democrats published most of their exile writings
Tageszeitung Die Neqg
and Paris, where the Pariser Tageblatt Pariser
were edited
Weltbuhne and other publications of the literary immigration
aus den
Source: Exil Literatur 1933-1945, Eine A usstellung
until 1940.
Frankfurt
Auflage
Bestanden der deutschen Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
1967, 3rd edition.
,

.

.

,

,

,

.

2AU

Dec 35, p. 4.

2
3

month.

After 1936 it was sold in subscription for five cents

and distributed free to newly arrived refugees from Germany.

a

copy
Until

1939 the paper almost exclusively mirrored the activities of
the German-

Jewish Club.

This organization had been founded in 1924 by German-Jewish

war veterans who had emigrated to the United States during the 19203.^
The activities of their Club centered upon the preservation and
dissemination of Jewish thought.

Announcements of speeches and discussions in

the paper showed that topics related to Jewish culture and religion as

well as subjects in the field of German literature and music dominated
the cultural schedule of the Club.

The announcements were conspicuous

for the total absence of American topics and the pages of the AUFBAU

reflected this phenomenon.

became the subject of

a

Although Americanization of the immigrant

more and more lively discussion among Club

members during the mid thirties, this debate was hardly ever enlightened

by any concrete description of life in America. 3
The Club's schedule of social and sports events was varied and

offered many different leisure activities to its members.

Sporting

events and, in the summer, outings, hikes, and camps were especially well
received.

This part of the Club's activities reflects an affiliation,

which indeed existed, with the principles of Zionist youth groups in

3

Will Schaber ed., Aufbau Reconstruction
im Exil New York, Koln 1972, p. 13.

-

Dokumente einer Kultur

,

A

Sep 36, p.

1.

5

The first articles explicitly on American politics appeared in
1938/39; the 1936 presidential election was only mentioned once. Sep 36,

p.

4.

,

3

£

Germany and Austria.
The general emphasis on sports also suggests
that most members of
the German-Jewish Club were rather young and
came mostly from

class background.

a

middle

The latter impression is confirmed by an analysis

of the early advertisements of the paper.

Among the principal advertisers

were members of the Club who offered their services as travel agents,
real estate brokers, accountants, doctors and lawyers. 7

Not too many

intellectuals seem to have been among the original readers of the AUFBAU.

German-Jewish refugees whom Club members contacted in the 1930s were
received with much cordiality.

These early newcomers were invited to

take part in the Club's activities and frequently recorded their exper-

iences in the new country for the AUFBAU readers.

g

As the influx of refugees from Germany and Austria accellerated

Club and paper began to focus their attention on this new group of
immigrants.

Some branches of the Club developed into specialized

agencies helping the newcomers to establish themselves.

In this respect

the Club assumed responsibilities similar to those of the early Jewish

Land smannschaf ten which had helped Jewish immigrants from eastern

Europe at the turn of the century.

The German-Jewish Club thus set up

social service departments where refugees were given general advice and

assistance, and helped financially on

a

small scale.

A legal information

service for those who wanted to secure visas for their friends and

^Dec 34, p. 4.
^AU Dec 26, 44, p.19.

®Jan 35, p.

9.

4

relatives was introduced and doctors of the German-Jewish
Club treated

needy refugees for lowered fees.
organized

a

Most important of all, the Club

job finding agency which, during the depression, had only

very limited means of helping its clients.

Its services expanded

steadily, though, and in 1940 it found jobs for an average of eighty
9

persons a month.

The German-Jewish Club, however, regarded the flow of

refugees as only temporary; consequently, the refugee aid facilities
were regarded in the 1930s as emergency measures rather than as an

integral part of the Club's services.^
In those early years the German-Jewish Club was still primarily

social organization.

a

The most valuable direct aid it could give to newly

arrived refugees was therefore the integration of newcomers into an

already half-Americanized group, where people would talk in

a

familiar

way about familiar topics, and go for hikes together.
The Formative Years

Only in 1939 did the paper become increasingly independent of the

German-Jewish Club.

News about events in Europe became

a

regular feature

of the AUFBAU and discussion about various aspects of immigration and
life in the United States was started then.

The AUFBAU became more and

more the paper of the German refugees in the United States.
The most important formal step toward this development had been the

hiring in 1937 of

a

regular full time editor, Rufolf Brandi.

^Nov 27, 40, p. 14.
l^Sep 36, p. 1.

He was

5

replaced in the spring of 1939 by another refugee,
Manfred Georg.

Both

Brandi and Georg had been professional journalists during
the time of
the Weimar Republic.

But, in contrast to many other editors of exile

papers, neither of them had gained much fame in Germany.

Only under

the enforced provincialism of exile did a journalist like Georg achieve
a

distinctive position as an editor and writer who could accommodate

almost all wings of the diversified refugee movement in his paper.

remained, editor until his death in 1966.
•

Georg

11

In 1939 the AUFBAU became a bi-weekly paper and, after December 1939,
it appeared weekly.

Its circulation jumped from 3000 sold copies at the

beginning of 1939 to 13,000 at the end of that year, and in 1941 it sold
30,000 copies weekly.

until today.

12

It has remained relatively constant at that level

Its format changed to regular newspaper size in 1939

and its length increased gradually from 12 to 32 pages.

From 1939 through 1941 the paper grew in importance and influence
First, instead of relying on the German- Jewish

in three notable ways.

Club for practical aid to refugees, the paper itself started to assume
the position of a clearinghouse for refugee self-help and political

information.

Second, the AUFBAU succeeded in integrating most parts
At times the

of the intellectual refugee movement into its pages.

names of the contributors to the paper read like

Who in Weimar Germany."

13

a

Third, the paper carried

list of "Who was
a

disproportionally

11 Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsch Emigration in den USA

1971, p.
12

127/129

Dec 22, 44, p. 27/28; Nov 29, 40, p. 4.

13 Apr.

5,

40, p.

14.

,

Dusseldorf

6

large advertising section where the readers could
communicate with each

other, ask for help, and offer special services.

These three elements

made up much of the unique profile of the AUFBAU from
1939 on.
In the early years of the paper, advertisements were an integral

part of the Club life.

Easily identifiable members of the German- Jewish

Club advertised business services, their marriages, and the birth of
their children.

In 1939 a regular advertising manager was taken on and

by 1940 over half of the AUFBAU consisted of advertisements and announcements.

The advertisements pages featured not only businesses which

mirrored the wide range of refugee enterprises and services, but they
also included classified sections with at least two pages of "for rent"
ads and increasing numbers of "help wanted" listings, as well as family

announcements, search notices for missing relatives, and, after 1940,
even marriage requests in the style of German papers.

From the AUFBAU'

s

advertisement sections

of the paper's readers emerges.

greater New York area.

a

rather accurate profile

Obviously, most of them lived in the

But during the war years the paper noticeably

increased its readership in other parts of the country, and by 1941 it
had readers in most states, especially on the West Coast.

Many readers

also advertised regularly from Cuba and from most South and Central

American states.

By 1942, 24 countries from Palestine to Australia had

AUFBAU sales representatives.

The paper was not only sold by subscription
14

but also on the streets of New York, London, and Jerusalem.
The majority of all AUFBAU readers were Jewish, but the paper's

The editors maintain that the paper is still
read in 45 countries today, Schaber op. cit., p. 15.

^Dec

22, 44, p.

28.

,

.

7

audience included the non-Jewish Hitler emigrants
as well, and even some
old time German-Americans

Although most members of the old German- Jewish Club must
have been
rather young, the age level of AUFBAU readers changed as the
age of the
average entering refugee increased through the years.

reflected in the advertisements.

This shift was

In the early years of the paper,

marriage announcements were frequent and almost no obituaries appeared.
In the 1940s deaths were announced as frequently as births, and in today's

paper family announcements consist almost entirely of obituaries.
The readers

1930s and 1940s.

craftsmen.

1

occupational classes did not change much during the

Most seem to have been business people and skilled

Very few signs of

a

sizable working class audience or of

upper class readership appeared in the AUFBAU'
It was this decidedly middle class touch

s

,

advertisement section.
an orientation which

mirrored the middle class makeup of the refugees generally, that made
the paper such an extraordinary and steady success among the emigres.

While the majority of German exile papers circulated only among
intellectuals, the AUFBAU merely made use of the talents of numerous

intellectual refugees.

Almost every well known German exile politician

or writer did contribute something to the paper between 1939 and 1945.

This improved the quality of the AUFBAU 's writing and greatly enhanced
its reputation.

The majority of its readers surely appreciated being

informed about Thomas Mann's life in exile or reading Franz Werfel's

newest novel.

15 June

But the intellectuals never dominated the paper in any

13, 41, p.

24.

8

respect.

They remained contributors, never becoming editors.

Not even

in its most successful times did the AUFBAU want to be anything
but the

voice of an otherwise silent majority of the refugee middle class.

Although the paper grew more and more independent of the Club,
the Club, like the paper, retained its own definite middle class flavor.
It came to serve as an organizational addition to the paper, rather than

the other way around; but this also included a rapid adaptability of the

Club to the needs of the increasingly numerous refugees.
the Club's social services were considerably extended;

German- Jewish Club had

a

and, as the

number of experienced old time immigrants

among its members, its services always had

normally very flexible.

With time,

a

personal touch and were

Except for "Selfhelp"

(a

social service

organization set up by German refugees in New York City during the
1930s)

,

the German-Jewish Club proved to be the only effective emigre

aid agency set up by refugees themselves.

By 1941 it offered

a

kinder-

garten, free summer camps for needy refugee children, social and legal

services of various sorts, an employment agency, trade union like
groups called Labor Councils,

a

charity fund

and several Landsmannschaf tliche Hilf sgruppen

(

.

Die Blaue Beitragskarte )

,

The latter two were

especially remarkable because they represented two different types of
charity organizations.

Die Blaue Beitragskarte was simply

a

charity

order to help
fund to which AUFBAU readers could contribute regularly in

needy refugees all over the world.

The Landsmannschaf ten were formed

the same name.
after the pattern of earlier Jewish organizations of

of Germany who tried
They were founded by refugees from certain parts
or were still in their old
to help their needy brethren who came from

.

9

home province.

Most visible in the AUFBAU were groups
from the southwestern

parts of Germany, especially Baden Pfalz
and Wurttemberg, which were areas

where a considerable part of the refugee migration
to the United states

originated,

16

The Club increased its membership base considerably during
the

early 1940s.

The organization's activities did not remain confined to

members in the immediate New York area, but the Club began to cooperate

with similar organizations in Newark, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.
1941, even the German-Jewish Club in Los Angeles, and

In the fall of
a

little later a

similar organization in San Francisco, started to publish their activities
in the paper and participate in discussion of various issues. 17

The years after 1939 not only brought a definite change in the

quality of the paper's writing and the size of its readership, but
topics and opinions of the AUFBAU also underwent considerable alterations.
Two important new tendencies stand out.

First, after Georg became editor,

the paper turned away from decidedly Zionist attitudes and also modified
its earlier opposition to the American Jewish establishment.

AUFBAU'

s

opinions became more liberal.

The

Mainstream opinions in American

politics were supported and no explicit anti-communist or anti-Russian

tendencies were visible.

The editors' antipathies focussed heavily on

fascism and Nazism during the 1940s.

The AUFBAU became known as the

foremost liberal voice of the German- speaking emigration to the United

16
17

Aug 15, 41, P- 13.
0ct 17, 41, P- 4.

10

States.

It underlined this reputation by
letting all wings of the

exile movement express their opinions in
the paper, Catholic conservatives as well as left wing socialists.

Second, this tendency to water

down political differences between the various
refugee organizations may
be partly explained by the AUFBAU

'

s

growing concern with American

domestic affairs and Americanization of the refugee.

rejection of involvement into exile politics.
chance for

a

This implied

The paper saw the only

satisfactory social and political future for the refugees

in complete Americanization and a definite turning away from Europe.

Thus by the summer of 1940 the Club had come to the conclusion, "Es
gibt fur die in den Vereinigten Staaten lebenden Juden deutscher

Abstammung im Auganblick keine irgendwie gearteten Bindungen an das
deutsche Reich und der Name German- Jewish Club ist ein Anachronismus
geworden."

After six months of deliberation it then decided to change

its name into New World Club in order to emphasize the American
L
orientation of£ the
organization.

18

But even if the paper was trying hard not to look backwards, it
did have open eyes and ears for events in contemporary Europe.

Infor-

mation about refugee movements and war events on the Atlantic front
formed a regular and important part of the AUFBAU.

19

_
The growing

repression of Jews in Germany, their deportation and, from late 1942,
the news about the systematic extermination policies of the Nazis were

1

8

°At the moment Jews of German extraction who live in the United
States have no ties whatsoever to the German Reich, therefore, the
name German- Jewish Club has become an anachronism. June 7, 40, p. 3;
also Sep. 27, 40, p. 2; Dec. 20, 40, p. 14.
19

A regular half to full page feature, "Wanderung und Immigration,"

started in 1941.

11

accurately recorded.
The AUFBAU became one of the most extensive
contemporary sources

about these events.

The paper had no regular correspondents in
occupied

Europe, but it used the services of the Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, had

correspondents in the free European capitals, and cultivated
connections

with several exile governments.

Above all, countless readers supplied

the paper with invaluable information they had received from
relatives
or other personal sources. 20

AUFBAU and the Unification of the Exiles

The paper and the German- Jewish Club wanted to be more than just

service organizations which would voice the political opinions of the

intellectual exile and other political emigre' groups.

One of the

most important characteristics of the German- Jewish Club was that,

within the disparate landscape of the political emigration, it
functioned in

a

unique way.

Unlike many of the small and individual-

istic exile organizations, the paper and the Club took considerable

pains to unite various groups of refugees as immigration increased from
Germany.

As early as 1936 the paper advocated the unification of all

liberal German- speaking people in the United States in the Deutsch-

Amerikanischer Kulturverband

21
.

But this organization, which aimed

mainly at defeating Nazi propaganda and presenting
German culture, never really got off the ground.

20

Schaber, op. cit. p. 14.

21 Jan

36,

p.

1.

a liberal image of

More successful were

12

the AUFBAU

's

attempts to unite the German emigre's in
the American

Federation of Jews from Germany (later American
Federation of Jews
from Central Europe).

This organization, founded in 1941, became
a

rather verbal though only loosely organized interest
group.

It met

considerable criticism from American Jewish organizations which
accused
the federation of German nationalistic tendencies.

During the late

war years it became mainly interested in the postwar problems of
German Jewry.

22

The AUFBAU, in order to emphasize its independent political role

within the refugee groups, added an advisory board to its organizational

body in 1941.

It consisted of a number of famous emigre personalities

and well known Americans who were supporters of the refugee cause.
all were Jews; many of them contributed articles to the paper.

advisory board was therefore more than
a

a

Not

The

mere figurehead; it represented

serious attempt to integrate part of the intellectual immigration

into the permanent organization of the paper.

23

The AUFBAU in the Postwar Years

Unlike any other exile paper, the AUFBAU not only survived the war
years but also continues to exist today.

But 30 years after the end

of World War II the function and format are again close to the pattern
It no longer speaks as the journal of Germans in

of its early days.

exile, nor has the AUFBAU become

22

Feb 2, 40, p.

5;

23

May 16, 41,

p.

1.

a

truly American paper as it is still

Radkau, op. cit., p. 143.

^
13

edited in German.

Indeed, any edition of the AUFBAU today
carries

fewer articles in English than the paper did during
the war.
does remain is a very faithful group of readers.

What

These former

refugees who read the paper today use the AUFBAU for finding
lost and

displaced persons all over the world.

Its readers are also regularly

informed about postwar German politics and the fate of Jews throughout
the world, particularly in Israel.

Some of the features and even

some of the editors are still the same as during the war years.

Most likely, therefore, the AUFBAU has survived the exile period because
it remained a German paper and could thus retreat again to its early

position as

a

means of communication for one of the many immigrant

groups in the United States.

0/

^Schaber, op. cit., pp. 16/17.

PART I.

REFUGEES AS A GROUP

14

CHAPTER

I

RHETORIC AND POLICIES OF ANTI -ALIEN
GROUPS

General Development

German-Jewish refugees who came to the United States
after 1933
were greeted by

a

wave of anti-alienism in America.

This form of

nativism, which had manifested itself repeatedly in
American history,

constituted one main obstacle to the assimilation of the refugees
into

American society.

This prejudice decisively shaped their perspective on

all aspects of life in America as well as their view of their own

position as newcomers.

Anti-alienism hampered the chances of many

refugees to settle down comfortably in the United States and to find

economic security and social adjustment.

The following pages describe

anti-alienism as it became visible in the legislative and political
actions of the government.

But as anti-alienism in

a

broader sense

permeated all aspects of refugee life, its more hidden forms constitute
a

basic theme through most of this study.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the belief was widespread

that America's strength and superiority rested on its ability to absorb

large groups of ethnically diverse immigrants.

This school of thought

had traditionally encountered strong resistance from nativist oriented
groups which contended that immigration would have detrimental effects
on American society unless it was regulated and selective.

The rhetoric

used by restrictionist groups varied at different times, and it had

different targets in the 19th and 20th centuries.

At times nativists

were associated with anti-semitic movements; sometimes they were also
engaged in anti-radical or anti-Catholic propaganda efforts.

The core

parts
of their argument remained the same, however; namely, that certain

^

15

of the population, especially some immigrant communities,
owed their

allegiance to some un-American cause or power.

Alien groups constituted

an uncontrollable and potentially subversive element in American society,

contended the nativists

.

The key arguments of many restrictionists in the 1930s rested on
the assumption that an uncontrollable mass of immigrants was flooding
the country from Germany and Austria.

While proveable figures were not

cited, this sentiment rested on the fact that refugees tended to concen-

trate heavily in certain parts of the country (especially in New York
City, where nearly all of them landed, and where about half remained).
Some restrictionists also suspected that many refugees were coming to
this country illegally or that they were entering on visitors visas
2

with the intention of staying.
To refute these arguments, supporters of the refugees' cause,

especially refugee aid agencies, collected data, including government
statistics, which demonstrated clearly that German and Austrian refugees

were entering the country at

a

mere trickle and that up to 1938 less

than half the German and Austrian immigration quotas had been filled.

As a matter of fact, the agencies could prove that migration back to

Germany was larger than immigration to the United States from Germany.

dohn Higham, Strangers

in the Land

,

3

New York, 1973, pp. 3-11, chs. 9-10.

Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Immigration, United States Senate, 75. Cong. 1937, p. 88.

deportation of Aliens

,

^"Admission of German Refugee Children," (Wagner Rogers Bill) Joint
States
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration, United
Naturalization,
and
Senate, and a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration
and 24, 1939,
House of Representatives, 76 Cong. 1st Session (Apr. 20, 21, 22,
Amherst 1968, p. 221, AU July 15,
pp. 24/25, p. 43; David Wyman, Paper Walls
,

39, pp.

1/2.

16

But even if only thousands, instead of
millions, of refugees came
to America,

the restrictionists contended, every
job-seeking immigrant

would still either deprive an American of employment
or he would be
added to the millions of Americans on public relief.

The discussion about

the admission of refugees centered around these
two arguments.

congressman even voiced suspicion that about
on relief rolls in the United States.

a

One

million foreigners were

The American Legion charged

Jewish-owned department stores with dismissing "100%" Americans in order
to hire refugees.

5

Physicians complained that refugee doctors who

charged lowered fees were flooding the country and depriving them of
6

their clientele.

Here again, refugee aid agencies, especially the American Friends

Service Committee and the National Refugee Service, made determined

efforts to counter these assertions with factual evidence.
As the strains on the job market were easing around 1940, restric-

tionists began to base their rhetoric on the argument that refugees

would bring political insecurity and unrest to the country.

They asked

how the American public could know whether the immigrants were true
refugees or potential fifth columnists for the Nazis.

At times, not

only the loyalty of the refugees to their new home country was questioned,
but that of the American refugee relief agencies as well.^

^

Deportation of Aliens

^Wyman,

p.

,

p.

54.

6/7.

^AU March 22, 40, p.

3;

Oct. 8, 43, p. 4.

^Wagner Rogers Bill, p. 217.

17

These nativist attitudes, while important
to the lives of those

refugees already living in the United States,
raised even more problems

when they resulted in direct actions that
regulated the admission of
new immigrants from Central Europe.

During the Depression, most

potential immigrants to the United States, but especially
the less

wealthy refugees, had considerable difficulties in securing
immigration
visas.

The main hurdle for them was the rigorous screening by American

consular officers abroad who weeded out everybody who, in their eyes,
O

was at all likely to become

a

public charge.

During the late 1930s,

when the refugee problem became more pressing, President Roosevelt
required his consular officers to apply a somewhat more liberal policy
in issuing visas for refugees from Germany and Austria.

The president

also began efforts to solve the refugee question on an international

basis in collaboration with Great Britain.
,

bore no tangible results.

But these long range efforts

9

Thus the executive branch of the government was only partly

successful in its attempt to find

a

solution that would truly help the

persecuted people in Central Europe and also keep restrictionism at
home within bounds.

Congress, meanwhile, was engaged in

a

series of

confrontations in hearings on immigration and alien legislation.

In

1939 the debate between restrictionists and liberals in the House and

the Senate was intensified due to a dramatic increase in the influx of

refugees after the Austrian Anschluss in early 1938 and the German

pp. 4/5; Robert Divine, American Immigration Policy
Univ. Press 1957, pp. 94/95.
8Wyman,

^Wyman, pp. 43ff.

,

Yale

18

Knstallnacht late in the same year.

The height of the legislative debate

about the refugee problem was reached during the
spring of 1939 at the

hearings on the Wagner-Rogers Bill,

a

proposal which would have allowed

20,000 German refugee children to immigrate outside of the regular

German quota.
^

Due to the influence of restrictionist groups in Congress,

reflection of the strong anti-alien sentiment in the population in
10

general,

the bill did not pass.

11

Although the outbreak of the war in 1939 curtailed immigration from
Central Europe sharply, the influence of anti-alien groups in the
legislature did not diminish, but merely took another shape.

Refugees

from Germany and Austria were now portrayed as potential spies for
Hitler.

The passing of the Smith Act in 1940 reflected suspicion of all

foreigners.

It made registration and fingerprinting of every alien

mandatory and also provided for deportation of aliens who were considered
to be enemies of the nation.

12

Internal security laws were further tightened after Pearl Harbor.

Several new regulations restricted the mobility of enemy aliens to

varying degrees.

Refugees from Germany and Austria had to have official

permits to travel and they were not allowed to possess cameras or short-

wave radios or to go near military installations.

Refugees were also

barred from security related jobs in defense industries.

During 1942

strict curfew regulations went into effect in California for enemy aliens
and Japanese Americans.

^Charles Stember et. al., Jews
^Wyman, pp. 75ff.
•^Ibid

.

,

p.

188

in the Mind of America

,

N.Y.

1968, p.

145

.
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The AUFBAU's Reaction to Anti-Alienism

Throughout the war the AUFBAU was very much
concerned with the
fact that aliens, and refugees in particular
were targets of nativist

verbal attacks and subject to special legal and social
restrictions.
Yet the paper showed an astounding inability to discuss
and analyze anti-

alienism openly as
mood.

a

sentiment that held an important place in the public

Anti-alienism as

a

common prejudice among Americans presented

a

problem that the paper did not dare to face directly because that would
have meant questioning the much lauded American spirit of tolerance and
.

,
equality.

13

Nonetheless, the AUFBAU showed

widespread anti-alienism was.

a

clear awareness of how

This is shown in the countless rebuttals

of anti-alien attitudes and the numerous defenses of the refugees'

position that the paper published.

Usually the refugees' cause was

upheld in much the same way that most refugee aid organizations had
defended it: with statistics and factual reports.

14

In addition,

numerous prominent Americans, including government officials, supported
the refugees in public statements which the paper eagerly printed.

Especially after 1940, such well known personalities as Eleanor Roosevelt,^
the President, himself,"^ Attorneys General Robert Jackson^ and

^\[ar. 8, 40, p.

^Aug.

15,

^Apr.

5,

39, p.

40, p.

2;

Oct. 11, 40, p. 2.

12;
3;

May 12, 40,

7.

p.

Nov. 2, 41, p.

1;

16

Nov. 22, 40, p. 1; Jan 24, 41, p.
Apr. 10, 42, p. 3; Feb. 16, 42, p. 6.
17

Aug.

1,

39,

p.

12.

8;

May 30, 41,

p.

1.

Oct 3, 41, p.4; Jan

9,

41, p. 4;

8
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Francis Biddle,
sentiment.

1

and others

warned against an outbreak of anti-alien

They called it unAmerican, unpatriotic and
unchristian, and

defended the refugees in many other respects.

Obviously, the AUFBAU

readers were the last ones who needed to be warned
of anti-alienism,
but the paper printed these messages to reassure
its readers that some-

thing was being done about

a

disquieting problem.

If the AUFBAU hesitated to scold Americans for their
prejudices,

the paper was certainly not afraid to criticize refugees for somewhat

similar attitudes.

considered to be

a

Anti-alienism among the refugees themselves was
serious problem by the paper.

The editors discussed

cases where aliens were falsely denounced as spies by other aliens, and
they warned the refugees not to be overly suspicious of other German,

.

speaking people
,

m
.

the United States.

20

Because the AUFBAU was unable to cope with anti -alienism as

a

social

phenomenon, it tried to deal with the problem of the status of aliens

through discussion of its legal implications.

From the late thirties

on, when the influx of refugees had become noticeable and had caused a

number of legislative measures in regard to new immigrants, the AUFBAU
had regularly carried

great deal of information about visa regulations,

a

immigration possibilities, and alien legislation.
achieved the position of

18 Nov

.

22, 40, p.

1;

a

The paper soon

central information and lobbying agency for

Oct.

18, 40,

p.

1;

Nov. 19, 43, p.

l^E.g., Governor Lehman (New York), July 12, 40, p.
90

March

8,

40, p.

2;

Sep.

11, 42,

p.

40.

1.

1;

Oct. 6, 42, p.4

21

a

more liberal refugee policy
and less stringent alien
legislation. 21
Before the American entry into
the war, the AUFBAU

'

s

reports about

refugee and alien policy were very
factual and hardly ever contained
clear criticism or individual comment.
Roosevelt's attempt to solve
the refugee question on an
international basis in the late 1930s did

draw favorable comment and its chances
of success were appraised
22

carefully.

in general, the United States policy towards
refugees

was accepted

3

until, in the summer of 1941, the State
Department

virtually stopped the issuing of visas and began
rescreening all who
had already received them.
the paper.

This move caused serious criticism in

It was seen as an unnecessary and discriminatory
procedure

initiated by an overzealous bureaucracy.

were cited as responsible for it.

Yet no particular individuals

O£

Shortly before Pearl Harbor, the low spirits of the refugees in
regard to their legal status rose briefly when the Hobbs Bill proposed
a

distinction between refugees and enemy aliens from Germany, Italy,

and Japan.

The AUFBAU promptly suggested that refugees should hence-

forth be called "involuntary German nationals," but the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor finished the refugees' hope in this respect. 2 6

E.g., information column An Alle (For All) starts Jan.
22 0ct
23
2

Jan.

39,

p.

10.

16, 41,

p.

12;

15,

Dec.

15,

39, p.

42, p.6.

1.

\lyman, pp. 193ff.

23
2

.

2,

June 20, 41, p.

^Dec. 5, 41, p.

2;

4;

June 27, 41, p

July 17, 42,

p.

.

7;

July 4, 41, p.4/5; July 11, 41, p.l

2;

Aug

7,

42,

p.l.

,

22

After the American declaration of war,
refugees, more than ever
before, were regarded as enemy aliens

and as such were subject to legal

restrictions and public suspicion.

In this climate of opinion, the

AUFBAU did its best to appear optimistic
and confident, but its
actual feelings of ambivalence were reflected
in its articles about the
life of the refugees in the United States.

The paper assured its

readers that the label "enemy alien" was merely

concrete meaning. 27

a

technicality without

It felt encouraged when Attorney General Francis

Biddle proclaimed that loyal refugees did not need to
fear any

harassment by government authorities. 28

Biddle also declared that no

regulation barred refugees from working in factories, other than the
few exceptions in the defense industries.

2

^

Nevertheless aliens had

difficulties in obtaining employment in heavy industries.

In many

cases, discriminatory practices against refugees increased during the
war.

30

But the AUFBAU continued to wear

relatively happy face,

a

although, in the atmosphere of continuing anti-alienism, attacks
O

1

against the American foreign language press also increased.
In Spring 1942, just when the paper was confident enough to declare

"Alienfrage kurz vor der Losung" (alien question close to solution)

27 Jan.

28
29
8

Dec

.

23, 42, p.

1;

19, 41, p.

1.

Jan. 2, 42, p.

-^March 20, 42,
28, 43, p.

4.

p.

20, 42,

p.4.

Jan. 30, 42, p.

1;

^Jan. 23, 42, p.

Feb.

7;

4;

Apr.

13, 42,

1.

p.

Apr. 24, 42, p.

16.
4;

Aug. 28, 42,

p.

5;

May

23

controls on aliens became more comprehensive. 32

Aliens residing in

the United States were screened for
possible subversive intent by the

Justice Department, and those suspected of
disloyal behavior towards
the United States were incarcerated in camps. 33

inform its readers about these events in

a

The AUFBAU tried to

neutral manner, but the

paper's apprehensions about reprisals against refugees
obviously had
not been stilled.

The practical effects of most restrictions were not

too harsh, but fears that refugees would be evacuated
from coastal

regions and interned in camps were widespread. 3 ^
For West Coast refugees, these suspicions became

when in April 1942

a

partial reality

rather strict curfew was instituted.

a

Enemy aliens

as well as Japanese Americans were forbidden to go more than five miles

from their homes and they had to observe an
The AUFBAU'

s

8 p.m.

to 6 a.m. curfew.

California readers showed considerable bitterness about

these measures, which, they contended, destroyed many important parts
of their newly found existence.

35

Enforcement authorities were more or

less openly attacked for their strictness;
a

.

,

patient attitude were

33

33

Apr. 17, 42, p.

May 15, 42,

3 ^May

33

42, p.

Feb.
17;

a

1;

p.

7;

15, 42, p.

1.

13, 42,

May

1,

36May 15, 42,

p.

1;

42, p.
p.

minority.

May

36

3, 42, p.

those refugees who advocated

The sudden protest quieted down

1.

Oct. 23, 42, p. 22; Oct. 23, 42, pp.

March 20, 42,

p.

1;

19;

3.

Apr. 3, 42, p. 17; Apr. 17,

17.

17, p.

1,

June 12, 42, p. 17.
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rather quickly, however, as the measures
were lifted on January

1,

1943. 37

Concerning the continuing repression of Japanese
Americans, the

AUFBAU showed little understanding.

This is quite remarkable, as,

from the outset, Japanese Americans were in much the
same situation as

refugees.

For no concrete reason, both groups were suspected of being

potentially subversive, regardless of their status as political
refugees or as citizens of the United States.

But, somehow, Japanese

Americans were another class of aliens, the AUFBAU maintained.

Their

loyalty remained questionable, the bonds of their race, it was declared,

were more important to them than their political allegiance.
it seems,

OO

Thus,

the AUFBAU not only continued to promote the myth of the

melting pot in face of direct evidence against the openness of American
society, but the paper also accepted some of the nativist’s views, as

they applied to non-German immigrants.

37 Jan.
3

^March

1,

6,

42, p. 5.
42, p.

15.
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CHAPTER

II

REFUGEES AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Anti-Semitic Movements in the 1930s

Closely connected to anti-alienism both in formal
appearance and
in psychological causation was anti-Semitism.

The main distinction

between the two on the political level in the 1930s was
that, while

anti-alienism

as a widespread

public prejudice openly influenced

concrete political action, anti-Semitism, though also rampant in

American society, led only
impact.

a

fringe existence in terms of political

If involved in political action, anti-Semitism preferred to hide

in the more rational and respectable costume of anti-alienism.

Groups that had

a

distinct anti-Semitic appeal were numerous, though

most were small and shared few common characteristics.
came into existence between 1933 and 1938,

The majority

though some had originated

in the 1920s like the Ku Klux Klan offshoots in the Midwest.

prospered only in the depression years.

2

Most

While an upsurge of activity

occured during the presidential campaign of 1936, the actual peak of

organized anti-Semitism was reached in the mid-1940s. 3
The actual size and structure of the anti-Semitic organizations
are very difficult to determine.

They ranged from the millions of

'‘Donald Strong, Organized Anti-Semitism in America

pp.

,

New York, 1941,

146/147.
9

Especially the Black Legion, see David Chalmers, Hooded Americanism
Chicago, 1968, pp. 309ff.
^Strong, pp. 146/147.

,

,
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passive supporters (listeners) of Father
Coughlin's radio speeches 4 to
over

a

hundred small organizations such as the
Edmondson News Service. 5

An analysis of supporters of the more
sizable and stable anti-Semitic
organizations points towards largely native American,
lower-middle
class support.

Except for Father Coughlin's National Union For
Social

Justice, which claimed to have five million followers
in 1939 and which

was the largest anti-Semitic movement, all other groups
counted mainly
£

Protestants as their members.

Organized anti-Semitism was concentrated in the Northeastern and

Mid-Atlantic States, in the Midwest, and on the Pacific Coast.

It was

most strongest in the urban centers of New York, Chicago, and Los

Angeles. ^
a

But indications are that most supporters of these groups had

small town or rural background.

Gerlad Winrod

'

s

Christian Defenders,

for example, had a decidedly small town Bible Belt following.

g

William

Pelley's "Silver Shirts", the other important Protestant organization,

recruited many of its members from the only superficially urbanized
regions of the Pacific Coast.

9

^Ibid, p. 63.
5 Ibid,

p.

14,

pp.

79f f

.

pp.

124-132.

(L

D

Coughlin claimed five million followers in 1936. A Gallup Poll
counted 3,500,000 listeners to his radio speeches in 1939. Geoffrey
Smith, To Save a Nation New York, 1973, p. 128; Seymor M. Lipset and
Earl Raab The Politics of Unreason New York, 1973, p. 170.
,

,

^Strong, pp. 144/145.
®Ibid, p. 76.

^Smith, p. 59; Lipset, p. 163.

,
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Most anti-Semitic groups had

a

decidedly native-American background,

with the exception of the German-American
Bund which led
separate existence for that very reason.

a

somewhat

Anti-Semitic groups believed

their primary task was to arouse the
public about the peril posed to

America's democratic and Christian order, by
powerful, sinister forces,
among which the Jews, together with radicals,
functioned prominently. 10

Anti-Semitic groups differed in their opinions as to
what practical
actions should be taken to halt this threat.

Most of their activities

remained rhetorical and most of them were unable to translate
their
11
rabble rousing propaganda into any definite political
programs.

The

"German-American Bund" and the "Silver Shirts" alone claimed that they
would support

violent fascist takeover in the United States. 12

a

Public

belief held, though, that in reality still other organizations advocated
a

Nazi-style putsch and that some were actively supported by Hitler.

12

With the easing of the depression and the beginning of the war,
the activities of most anti-Semitic organizations declined sharply.

Anti-Semitism as such, though, did not decline among Americans.

An

increasing number of people believed, for example, that Jews were an

overly powerful group, especially when economic and financial matters
were concerned.

14

Potential support for an anti-Semitic campaign also

10

Strong, pp. 163/164.

11

Strong, Ch. XIV passim.

12

Ibid.

12 Ibid.,
12h

p.

162.

Ibid., pp. 38/39, pp. 55/56.
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reached considerable intensity in
the mid-forties, although Hitler’s
policy towards Jews was rejected by
most Americans as too radical. 15
The events of the war itself influenced
prejudice against Jews,

who were suspected of being more
frequently exempted from the draft and
of trying to evade combat duty.
to risk endangering their lives;

disloyal to American democracy. 16

Jews were supposed to be too shrewd

they were thus seen as a group basically
This illustrates well the psychological

pattern upon which much anti-Semitic prejudice has
been founded through
history.

Jews were considered to be cowardly and weak;

stand up for something or defend it openly.

they would not

Yet this belief was based

upon secret admiration of the supposed Jewish shrewdness.

Envy of Jews

who could appear weak and yet preserve their power that way has always
been

a

major characteristic of anti-Semitism.

17

Refugees in the 1940s

were prime targets for this kind of anti-Semitic thinking.
The AUFBAU and Anti-Semitism in America

The AUFBAU was definitely aware of the widespread anti-Semitism

with which most refugees were confronted, in the United States in the
1930s and 1940s.

In numerous articles the paper urged its readers and

the American public not to take the anti-Semitic activities of some

Americans too lightly; unawareness and

a

lax optimistic attitude had

'“’Charles Stember et al, Jews in the Mind of America, New York
1968, p. 120/124.
16

Ibid

,

pp.

129, 134.

17 Ibid.,

pp.

134-140

.
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cost many Germans their lives or
had forced them to leave their
country.

18

Yet anti-Semitism was not so much
seen as

a

problem which

hindered the refugees' social integration
and acceptance, but it was
considered to be a phenomenon which threatened
directly the political
order of the United States.

In the eyes of the AUFBAU the most important

and dangerous forces were represented by
anti-Semitic organizations.

The anti-Semitic prejudice of Americans in general
was seen as less

perilous.

The anti-Semitism of such groups as the German
-American Bund

or the Silver Shirts appeared estremely threatening
to the paper

because it seemingly developed along the same lines as Nazism had
in
Germany;

that is, anti-Semitism appeared originally only as a minor

characteristic of movements whose ultimate aim was
of the state.

a

violent takeover

19

Around 1940 news about the activities of anti-Semitic groups looked
increasingly alarming to the AUFBAU, as organized anti-Semitism seemed
about to grow into
-

political support.

a

unified movement and appeared to be gaining

20

Just as in Germany ten years before, the AUFBAU

asserted, Nazi spies and right wing German-Americans were slowly infil-

trating American right wing movements, and Hitler's Gestapo agents were

more and more successful in using these organizations for their own
ends.

The German-American Bund was seen as the major vehicle of these

18 Ibid

^AU

.

,

pp.

117/118.

June 35, p.

1.

June 21, 40, p. 3.

.

.

30

systematic activities. 21
But anti-Semitic organizations
were not only infiltrated and

supported from abroad, the AUFBAU
told Its readers; even some
American

politicians were on the side of the
American Nazis.

"Los Angeles

Nazis Hall Wheeler," and "Anti-Semitism
In the Senate

-

Anti-Semites

and Anti-aliens Gather Around Senator
Reynolds," the paper announced. 22

And Colonel Charles Lindbergh's antl-Jewlsh
speeches received extensive

coverage

23

The discussion in the AUFBAU of anti-Semitism
as

a

widespread

prejudice that confronted the refugees in their
everyday lives began
only later, during the war. 24

in 1942 and 1943 the paper commenced

to write about anti-Semitic prejudice in the
United States as it appeared

in two main forms:

discrimination against Jews by employers, and

physical attacks by anti- Jewish rowdies in

a

number of large cities.

In all instances the articles were mainly concerned with the
illegality
of such acts.

brought against

With great satisfaction the paper reported the suit
a

New York City firm that refused to employ Jews, and it

advocated the establishment of

21 Apr.

22

1,

39, p.

Apr. 3, 42, p.

a

commission to set up measures to

24.
3;

Dec. 5, 41, p.

7;

see also section on German

Americans
23
2

2

43, p.

0ct. 17, 41, p.

15;

March 14, 41,

p.

9,Sep.

19, 41,

p.l;Jan,16, 41,p.l.

A

^General appraisals of anti-Semitism: May
42, p. 3; Apr.
Nov. 12, 43, p. 4.

“*Nov.
1;

6,

16, 43, p. 4;

1,

39, p.

5;

Apr. 23, 43, p.

Nov.
2;

13, 43,

Oct. 22,

p.

3.

.

.

.
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set up measures to "outlaw” anti-Semitic
discrimination in New York
26

_ _
state

The more general patterns of anti-Semitic
prejudice were only

occasionally discussed from

a less

legalistic point of view.

They

were, however, correctly connected with the climate
of fear and

suppressed aggression that was prevalent during the late
war years.
The AUFBAU found it remarkable and frightening that Jews
were

a

subject

of discrimination at a time when the country was fighting
a war against
the world's prime oppressor of Jews. 22

Even though the paper had not been confident enough to discuss
the prevailing anti-Semitic prejudice in America at an earlier time,
it seems to have been cognizant of its existence in the 1930s.

In

order to reassure its readers of its awareness of the problem, and to
show them that this concern was shared by others, AUFBAU published

numerous appeals by government officials and other prominent people

condemning anti-Semitism as something undemocratic, un-American, or
un-Christian

28

Besides letting others (all of them Christians!) speak in their
behalf, the AUFBAU'

s

editors sometimes fought anti-Semitic prejudices
Did Jews control Wall Street?

with their own methods.

No, said the

AUFBAU, and gave statistics about Jewish holdings in major banks.

26

Apr

.

30, 43, p.

6;

22 Nov.

19, 43, p.

3.

28
.

Dec 24, 43, p. 4.

19, 41, p. 1; Feb. 21, 41, p . 1; March 7, 41, p.
4; March 7, 41, p. 6; July 1, 39, p . 1

Sep.

29 Dec.

22,

39, p.

16.

29

3;

!

Apr. 5,

32

Nor did Jews control the government
to any extent, the AUFBAU asserted

m

an extensi ve report dealing with
Jews who had reached high positions

in Roosevelt's New Deal administration. 30

The paper made Jews as a

group as inconspicuous as possible as
far as questions of financial and

economic power were concerned.

This was a strategy shared by most

American Jewish organizations which had to cope
with the refugee problem. 31
Whenever questions of active patriotism were concerned,
however,
the AUFBAU emphasized the outstanding role Jews
played.

This especially

came to the forefront during the war years when the paper
portrayed
Jews as outstanding soldiers who received numerous awards for
their

excellent performance in combat duty.

Jewish soldiers were in no way

less active or successful than the rest of "our boys," the AUFBAU

Not only in this war, but throughout American history, Jews

had fulfilled their patriotic duties.

Stories about the Jews in the

American Civil War and the first World War confirmed the paper's view
of the Jew as an active American patriot.

33

Thus in its own way the

AUFBAU reacted very sensitively to the most serious anti-Semitic
prejudices that confronted refugees in America.
The AUFBAU

somewhat split.

3

's

overall perspective on American anti-Semitism was

Up to 1942 it viewed anti-Semitic action mainly as an

^Apr. 24, 41, p.

17;

Apr.

3 -*-David

3.

17, 41, p.

Wyman, Paper Walls Amherst, 1968, pp. 23-26; Zosa Szajkowski,
"The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees," in: American Jewish Historical
Quarterly Dec. 1971, pp. 105-112.
,

,

33
33

Aug. 21, 41, p.

1;

Oct.

9,

Feb

2;

Apr.

10, 42, p.

.

27, 42, p.

42, p.

1.

7.

^
33

essentially foreign movement whose
American actors were manipulated by
the Nazis.

On the other hand it was much more
difficult to deal openly

with the anti-Jewish prejudices and
behavior that the refugees encountered
in their everyday lives and which
made Americanization so painful and

difficult for them.

Like many Jewish organizations, the paper
obviously

saw itself in too vulnerable a position
to counter this kind of anti-

Semitism with anything but defensive articles
and proclamations.
This attitude changed notbaly during the late
war years when,

together with American Jewish organizations, the paper
began to face

anti-Semitism in the United States in

a

more open and fundamental way.^

Although the AUFBAU avoided questioning the basic tolerance of
Americans
towards minorities, it was able to view anti-Semitism as
spread phenomenon.

a

very widely

This implies that the refugee community had gained

insight as well as confidence during the war years; it was able to see

beyond its immediate problems as

a

separate group within American Jewry.

And, most important of all, refugees in this instance were able to

question society around them, instead of blaming themselves for most
things that interfered with their Americanization.

^The American Jewish Conference, representing a large part of
American Jewry, discussed Anti-Semitism in the United States extensively
in 1943; July 16, 43, p. 16; July 23, 43, p. 1; July 30, 43, p. 13.
35

Apr. 16, 43, p. 4.
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THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL IMAGE OF
THE REFUGEE

"A lot of immigrants are coming to
this country, they have
life and they take over, you can't
deal with one and

awful dirty, though they have money."

a

soft

a

lot of them are

1

Few sources draw such

a

hostile

portrait of the refugee as did the person
interviewed in Adorno's
study on anti-Semitism.

Nevertheless, it was precisely this kind of

image that grew out of the anti-alien and
anti-Semitic attitudes and

propaganda so prevalent in the United States in the
1930s and 1940s.
While organized anti-Semitism and anti-alien politics
seldom influenced
the refugees'

lives as greatly as the personal hostility which they

encountered daily, it must be assumed that confrontations with the
ethnocentric attitudes of many Americans decisively shaped the refugees'
image of their own position in American society, more so than any official

anti-alien policies or discriminatory laws.

Very few printed sources give

a

clear portrait of the "dirty
o

refugee," as many Americans apparently saw him.

Westbrook Pegler,

right wing journalist whose syndicated column ran in more than

a

a

hundred

American papers, and the Hearst Press, especially the New York World
Telegram

,

^

did attack the refugees' attitudes and behavior in their

columns at times.

But these open polemics were exceptions.

characteristic of the attitude of the popular press was

1

a

More

LIFE magazine

T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality , New York,

^AU Jan. 3, 41, p. 7.
O

June 5, 41, p.

4;

Jan.

17, 41, p.

9.

1948, p.

6'
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article about "royal refugees" which
appeared in December 1940. 4
dealt with

a

It

number of crowned or formerly crowned
families from

Europe who had found refuge from the
war in the United States or
Canada.

The article supplemented a picture
report about British

refugee children in their American foster
homes and

a

list of eight

Rules for Refugees, Royal or Otherwise, While
in America."

The

accounts about royalty and the British children
were friendly enough.
The "Rules," on the other hand, consisted of
a mixture of sarcasm

and admonition (see appendix).

But, apparently, advice like "Refugees

must not band together in little swarms, chattering and
squealing in
their foreign bird talk" touched directly the most sensitive
spots in
the relationships between refugees and Americans.

At least, not many

refugees or their defenders were able to see this as the joke LIFE
intended it to be.

The reaction of pro-refugee groups to LIFE's

"Rules" was very hostile.

while the "Rules" were

It is noteworthy in this context that

rather crude joke, the article at large gave

a

grossly distorted view of the refugee problem,
not criticize.

a fact

a

which AUFBAU did

Inasmuch as this was the very first treatment of the

refugee problem in the magazine, information which focussed on exiled

kings and British middle class children (none of them Jewish) was misleading to say the least.
Since the AUFBAU'

s

foremost goal was to Americanize the refugee

to the fullest extent in his daily life, the paper reacted with almost

4

LIFE, Dec. 16, 40, pp. 89ff.

^Jan. 3, 41, p.

7;

Jan. 9, 41, p. 24.

36

unprecedented anger to accusations, like
those of LIFE, that refugees
were an obnoxious and unassailable
lot.
The newcomers, the paper
said, were doing their best to become
acquainted with the manners and

customs of their new home country and
the AUFBAU was doing everything
it could to help them in this
process.

Anti-refugee polemics, however,

would only undermine such efforts.

Assimilation and learning how to become an American
was

a

process

that should be primarily monitored by the refugees
themselves, the

AUFBAU indirectly contended, and consequently the paper itself
often
gave hints on how to behave and what to do in order to be
more American.
Thus the AUFBAU itself is an extremely rich source of information
about
the stereotypic image of the European refugee that many Americans

supposedly had.
To start de-Europeanization, the paper usually advocated a change
in the outer appearance of refugees.

often meant an American make-up.

Americanization thus literally

Especially on the women's page,

such suggestions appeared often and with detailed instructions. 7

The

suggestions on eliminating any European appearance also included

advising refugees to change their names and handwriting in order to be
less conspicuous in the United States.
a

For the paper the persistence of

range of behavior which was considered particularly European was also

of much concern.

It often advised its readers in rather urgent tones to

abandon such habits as talking German loudly in public or sitting

^Jan. 3, 41, p. 7.

Especially May

31, 40, p.

8.
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around in coffeehouses
talking in German. 8
The AUFBAU seems rather
superficial In putting emphasis
on the

Americanization of such characteristics.

But the reader could soon

discover that the AUFBAU's stress
on such seemingly unimportant
habits
such as talking loudly or
sitting around In caf^s was ultimately
aimed
y

at changing more fundamental
non -American attitudes of the
emigres.

By advising the Immigrant on how to
appear as an inconspicuous American,
the paper hoped to break up a
widespread tendency of refugees to stick

together, live in the same neighborhoods,
go to the same coffeehouses
and restaurants, and behave like any
unassimilated ethnic group In

New York City.

9

Isolation on the part of certain groups of immigrants

might have been possible in earlier times, but
the AUFBAU insisted
that in the case of these refugees the situation
was fundamentally

different.

10

Unlike any other immigrant group, the refugees could

not muse about the past and foster

country.

a

memory about the good old home

Speaking German for the refugees did not just mean "chattering

and squealing in their foreign bird talk," but it meant using the
same

language the Nazis spoke.
To the AUFBAU the Nazis had taken not only property and social

position from German Jews, but also large parts of their historical

8 July

19, 41, p. 8; June 27, 41, p. 9; May 31, 41, p. 2; July 19,
Aug. 23, 40, p. 4; about refugees' bad behavior in a summer
resort at Lake Placid: Oct. 23, 42, p. 6; Oct. 22, 43, p. 28. On
refugee subculture in New York City see Jud Teller, Strangers and
Natives New York 1968, Ch. 4, passim.

40, p.

10;

,

^Sep. 27, 40, pp. 3/4.
-*-0july

19, 40, p.

10;

May 31, 41,

p.

2.
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and cultural identity.

A new start in the United States could
only be

attempted if the refugee fully realized
this fact.
This theory of radical assimilation
underlay much of the discussion

among AUFBAU readers about the pro's and
con's of speaking German.

Could

a

German language paper which helped to keep
German culture alive

on its pages legitimately ask its readers
to give up speaking German?

Neither readers nor editors wanted to change the
AUFBAU into an

English paper.

And in numerous letters readers expressed the opinion

that writing and talking German with each other was
necessary to keep

one's true cultural identity. 11
this kind of cultural pluralism.

The AUFBAU itself was not in favor of
It saw its main function as a German

language paper as a temporary help to introduce the refugees gradually
to the American way of life.

12

But in other fields that had no connection with the language

problem the AUFBAU chided the refugees for all kinds of non-American
behavior.

Most of these accusations had to do with the refugees'

European perception of society, especially with concepts of class and
authority that would bring them into conflict with American views.

13

Men and women, for example, had equal rights and equal duties in
America, the paper told its readers.

It was contrary to American

social behavior that husbands should demonstrate any kind of male

supremacy over their wives, just as it was inappropriate for parents

11

May 31, 40,

p.

2;

^Dec.

19, 41, p. 4.

^Nov.

19, 43,

p.

7.

June 7, 40, p. 9.
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to inflict a strict and
formal discipline upon their
children. 14

The refugee at work, or the
one who was looking for

also

a

frequent target of the paper's
Americanizers

a

job, was

Apparently the

.

refugees' chances of finding jobs
were often reduced by the wrong
kinds of behavior at interviews
with prospective employers.
as well as the German-Jewish Club,

refugees aware of
situations.

a

The AUFBAU,

took considerable pains to make the

few basic rules they had to observe in
such

Thus any boisterousness, as well as timidity
or shyness,

was criticized.

Instead of boasting about past achievements and

experiences, the refugees should show

a

generally pleasing personality

and the willingness to accept other people's
advice. 15

The know-it-all

attitude of some who could not adapt to the differences
and changes of
the American system was often the subject of criticism
by Americans.

1

^*

But in many cases the immediate future looked so bleak to
the

refugee who wanted to gain economic independence and

a

better social

status that the boasting about past experience was only too under-

standable.

Many were not even able to comfort themselves with the

memories of

a

glorious past, but instead sank into pessimistic, depressed

states of mind.

But the AUFBAU could not even concede that "Kaffee-

hauspessimismus" (coffeehouse pessimism) was
refugees.

1

17, 40, pp.

pessimism was essentially non-American,

13/14.

^May 17, 40, p. 13; Jan. 5, 40, p.

16

legitimate mood for the

This paralyzed state of mind would never enable the refugee

to make it in the New World;

14May

a

Aug. 23, 40, p.

9;

July 15, 39, p.

3.
7.

.
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even subversive ("The Flfth
Column of Pessimist), the
paper 8colded . 17
But could a paper which
carried extensive accounts of
the perse-

cution of Jews in Europe condemn
pessimism and anxiety in those who
had
narrowly escaped from the concentration
camps? Could the AUFBAU
criticize the refugees for speaking
German and banding together when
the paper and the German-Jewish
Club were parts of an extensive
German

emigre apparatus which served many
needs of the newly immigrated?

Many AUFBAU readers agreed that the
paper was at times keeping an
overzealous watch on the refugees' conduct.

In letters to the editor

they advocated that German should
not be abandoned by the refugees as
a

group, and that it was not fair to accuse
them of

a

variety of non-

American mannerisms just because, as in any
group, some of them could
not stop talking about the old times and missed
coffeehouses too much.

There were less adaptable people in every group and
there was no
reason why the refugees, of all immigrant groups, should
be more American
than the Americans in their behavior. 18

But the AUFBAU's attitude

i

towards Americanization remained uncompromising, and the paper showed

even less leniency in this respect during the war years than it had

before
What Made the Refugees

a

Class:

the View of the AUFBAU

In the eyes of the AUFBAU, two traits characterized the refugees
as a separate class of newcomers.

^Aug.
18

Sep.

23, 40, p. 4; Aug.
1,

39,

p.

20;

Sep.

1,

The most important principle of

36, p.

19, 41, p.

1.

3;

Jan 3, 41, p. 7.
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refugee life, which dominated in
the AUFBAU's Americanization
ideology, was the need to ban the
past from one's memories.

The paper,

therefore, sharply criticized the desire
to keep German habits alive,

conciously or unconsciously.
leading
idea.

a

The second point, the necessity of

purely future-oriented life, was

a

logical result of this

American society and American customs were to
form the exclusive

interest of the refugees, the AUFBAU contended.

These two ideas were

the basis of group cohesion and solidarity.

This special way of defining one's own group was
remarkable in

many ways.
a

First, it was the exact opposite of what made the refugees

group for outsiders, who judged refugees by their strange
and sometimes

obnoxious behavior.

For the AUFBAU, on the other hand, the cohesiveness

of the refugees as a group was based on the assumption that they, more

than everybody else, wanted to get rid of this behavior; group solidarity

was therefore founded on

a

negative principle.

While this negative part

of the refugees' self-definition remained clear at all times in the

paper, Americanization, the great positive uniting goal of all refugees,

was always

a

cloudy, undefined term.

The AUFBAU's advice on how to

become American hardly ever got beyond the do's and don't
day situations.

's

in every-

Beyond this pragmatic advice the nature of American-

ization was not described in any substantial way.

Just as the feelings

of most immigrants towards their new homecountry were unclear their

views of American society as

a

whole were fractioned as well.
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CHAPTER

IV

HOW DID THE REFUGEES FIT INTO
THE AMERICAN CLASS SYSTEM?
The historian is confronted with
an extraordinary phenomenon in
the study of the Americanization
of the refguees.

They had neither

a

definite image of themselves, their
cultural background, and their
actual social position as

a

group; nor could they envisage their

future as Americans in any concrete terms
within the framework of

American society.

Their means to build up

were very limited and mostly based upon
And yet, never before did

a

a

a

feeling of cohesiveness

shared negative experience.

minority group of immigrants reach such

high degree of assimilation within one generation.

a

In order to find

out why this was so, one has to consider the social
background of

German- Jewish refugees and understand their conception of America's
social order as shaped by their group experience.

Most historians of the refugee movement agree that the greatest
difference between the Hitler refugees from Germany and Austria and
most other immigrant groups in American history was the high educational
and social position the former group had held in its home country.^

The difference in occupational and social background was especially

striking if one compared the refugees, as many Americans did, with
Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who had come to this country in
the early 20th century.

^Maurice Davie, The Refugee in America New York 1948, p. 132;
also Kurt Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee New York 1944, p. 372.
,

,

^

.
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The origins of the differences
between these two groups of
Jewish
immigrants are to be found in the
different historical development
in
,

Eastern Europe and in most parts of
Germany in regard to the position
of Jews.
Jews in Germany, unlike those
in Eastern Europe, gained

considerable social and economic mobility
during the nineteenth century.
Up to 1930 no open persecution of
Jews had occurred in Germany for

more than a hundred years.

In the wake of the political reforms

influenced by the Enlightenment and the various
revolutions of the

mid-nineteenth century, some German states granted
Jews
equal to that of Christians.

a

legal status

A small Jewish elite was even permitted

to participate actively in the cultural life
of the cities.

Its

members attended literary and musical salons and some
of them became
well known artists themselves.

By then, some Jews had also begun to

participate in the democratization of German states; some of them on
the side of the revolutionaries, some as reformers.
It became the declared aim of the emerging Jewish middle class in

Germany to attain the recognized social position of this small elite.
Seemingly the most successful way to reach this goal was to get rid
of all attributes that were traditionally associated with Jewishness.

Thus language and religion ceased to be distinctive features of German
Jewry; many families converted to Christianity."^

When the Nazis began to classify all Jews as non-Aryans after 1933,
for the first time in their lives many Jews became aware that they were

^Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
1973, pp.
"^Ibid

56-68.

,

new ed., New York

.

.
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supposedly different fro m the rest
of society.
meant being
society.

a

non-person without the right of

Being
a

a

Jew suddenly

respected place In

Under the Impact of the policies
of the Nazis,

a

conception

of one's Jewishness In any
positive terms was even less possible
than

before
Thus, long before their arrival in
the United States, most German-

Jewxsh refugees had developed
a

group.

a

largely negative view of themselves as

They had experienced an extreme and sudden
uprooting of their

seemingly intact cultural identity, and, by the
time of their arrival
in the United States, they were thoroughly
disconnected from the old
as well as the new world.

Was complete Americanization, as the AUFBAU

advocated it, possible on this shaky basis?

Or were there more

realistic alternatives to total assimilation?
As the history of American immigration clearly shows, the assimilation of immigrant groups usually took place within two or three generations

The starting point for Americanization was in many cases

contained social structure built up among ethnic groups.

a

rather self-

Every member

of an immigrant group would find his special place within the class

order in this ethnic community.

Once achieved the ethnic framework

also provided the immigrant with

a

set of cultural and social values

that would gradually become more Americanized from generation to

generation

4

It is obvious that this gradual approach to assimilation via

ethnicity did not present

a

viable way of Americanization for these

^Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life

,

New York, 1964, chap.

6

-
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refugees.

'

Not only were refugees unable
to see themselves as an
ethnic
group, in any positive terms,
but a paper like the AUFBAU was
also
largely unable to perceive the
importance and value of ethnic
affiliation
in American society. 5

The refugees can therefore be
regarded as an

essentially new group of immigrants which
acquired few of the traditional
characteristics of previous immigrant groups.
Nevertheless, for immediate help and adjustment
the refugees,

consciously or not, turned to that American
ethnic group to which they
felt closest and which in turn offered the
most helpful assistance,

the American Jews.

The American Jewish community, however, was not

only one of the largest, but also one of the most
fractioned, ethnic
groups in the United States.
a

Only those refugees whose allegiance to

certain part of American Jewry was predetermined had no further

difficulty in joining American Jewish organizations.

Thus German

Jewish Zionists could readily become members of American Zionist

organizations

.

Likewise, the religious Jews did not encounter too many

obstacles in participating in the activities of Reform or Orthodox

congregations in the United States.
As far as the rest of American Jewish organizational life was

concerned, ready participation in their activities proved much more

difficult for the refugees.

In most organizations that were involved

in large scale political or charitable efforts, they would encounter

^A few references to the "Melting Pot" and the idea of "Cultural
Pluralism" appear in AU June 7, 40, p. 9; Nov 22, 40, p. 3; Apr 24, 41,
(L

Alexander Carlebach, "German Jewish Immigration and its Influence
on Synagogue Life," in Leo Baeck Yearbook 1964 pp. 355-359.
,

p.

9.

^

.
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the old rivalries between
Eastern European Jews (relatively
recent
immigrants) and German Jews (who
had come to the United States
in the

middle of the nineteenth century)

.

The latter were mostly middle and

upper middle class people who had
traditionally held the leading

position in the American Jewish community.

But by the 1930s they had

lost much of their former predominance
in American Jewish organizations
to Jews of Eastern European extraction.

Not only were the refugees caught in the
quarrels between these
two groups, but this conflict rervived some of
the same ethnocentric

bias towards "Polish" Jews that had prevailed in
Germany in the past.
There, just as in the United States, Eastern European
Jews had been

considered an uneducated proletarian class, much looked down upon by
the more middle class "Germans."

Apparently some refugees warmed up

their latent prejudices in the United States, even though they were

dependent upon the help of this very same group.
One other ethnic community that could have given assistance to
the refugees in their Americanization efforts were the German -Americans

This possibility did not look very attractive to the refugees, however.

Although German Americans and German-Jewish refugees shared the language
and much of the cultural tradition of Germany, there was more hostility

than interaction between the rather conservative German -American community
and the refugees.

Only German socialists (old time immigrants of

the Bismarck times as well as socialist emigres of the 1930s)

shared the

^AU Apr. 15, 39, p. 5; Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsche Emigration in
die USA 1933-1942, Dusseldorf 1972, p. 137.
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position as social and political
outcasts with the Jewish refugees.
For this reason the latter
groups had rather close contacts
with each
other
**

.

The only segment of society that
was ready to help German-Jewish

refugees, other than American Jews,
was the American intellectual

community.

This was not an ethnic group in
the basic sense in that

its main forms of cohesiveness did
not rest upon similar religious

beliefs or

a

common cultural heritage.

American intellectuals were

the social groups that had dissented from
the ethnic frames that

divided the rest of society.

9

Their values and their ways of life

were rather close to those of many European
intellectuals.

As a sizable

number of German Jewish refugees were teachers and
scientists, or
professionals and artists, they received considerable assistance
from

American intellectuals.

But the aid of the American intellectual

community was not entirely separate from the activities of other refugee
aid groups, as many intellectuals were involved in assisting the

refugee through various religious organizations and governmental action.
In the pages of the AUFBAU the problem of ethnicity received

minimal attention in connection with assimilation of the refugees.
paper apparently did not consider ethnicity to be

Americanization process.

a

The

vital part of the

The reason for this was clearly the result

of the refugees' inability to conceive of themselves as an ethnic group.

Therefore they were also unable to see that ethnic structures made up

^See section on German-Americans
^ Gordon,

pp.

224ff.

,

p.

6,

esp.

footnote 24.
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the dominant framework of
American society as a whole.

The refugees, as the AUFBAU
represented them, were much more

concerned with the fact that most of
them had suffered

a

loss of

status, at least in terms of their
European class conceptions.

refugees in the United States were forced
to start at

a

Most

working class

level, performing unskilled manual labor
for a livelihood.

The

chances and opportunities to leave this humble
starting position and to

move up into the white collar property-owning
class were the dominant
concerns' of the refugees. 10

Any discussion of one's social values and

one's position in American society took the most
concrete shape in the

paper where questions of work were concerned.

The refugees thus simply

escaped the conflicts they would have faced had they placed
themselves
in an ethnically divided society.

They retained their European point

of view that what mattered was simply the social class one belonged to,

which in turn would be determined through the work one performed.
did this seemingly simple solution really work?

Did it help the

refugees to face the reality of their lives as working people?

10

See chapter 5.

But

^

.
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CHAPTER

V

REFUGEES AND THEIR WORKING EXPERIENCE
It was one of the most crucial
and cruel coincidences that at
a

time when thousands of refugees
wanted to come to the United States,

eager to build up a new life and to
obtain

a

new dignity working their

way up the economic and social ladder,
the United States was in
severe economic crisis with millions
of Americans unemployed.

a

During

the depression years prospective
immigrants were therefore confronted

with an extremely restrictive admission policy,
one which kept immigration at a minimum in order to prevent competition
for jobs with

unemployed Americans.

The Roosevelt administration attempted to

modify this policy as the plight of the refugees from
Europe became more
urgent.

But restrictionist groups, which argued that refugees should

not be admitted in any substantial numbers as they were
likely to

displace American workers or become public charges, gained more and

more support among the population in the 1930s.

1

Throughout the mid-

thirties the government's refugee admission policy remained so restrictive that up to 1938 the German and Austrian immigration quotas had

been less than 50% filled.
Refugee aid organizations, confronted with the rising tide of

anti-alien sentiment, made concentrated efforts to refute the unemploy-

ment arguments of the restrictionists

.

Thus Refugees at Work

,

a

statistical study edited by Sophia Robison and sponsored by several

^David Wyman, Paper Walls
^Ibid.

,

p.

221

,

Amherst, Massachusetts 1968, pp. 6/7.

.
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refugee organizations, tried to
prove that a considerable number
of
refugees were not workers but
entrepreneurs who succeeded in establishing
their own independent businesses
within only one or two years of their
arrival.

These newly founded shops and small
factories not only

provided jobs for many Americans, but
also stimulated the American

economy in general and introduced new
goods and manufacturing methods
to the American scene.

Similarly, the National Refugee Service, in its

brochure Dividends from New Americans

argued that many refugees from

,

central Europe brought with them very special
skills as manufacturers
of specialties or as highly qualified craftsmen
and, far from increasing

competition, would actually stimulate the American economy.^

Other

statistical reports emphasized the fact that the number of refugees
as
a

whole was much too small to contribute significantly to the unemploy-

ment figure, and, besides, only half of the incoming refugees were

potential wage earners at all (the other half were children or older
people).

Of those who were employable, about 75% were completely self

sufficient and only 17% received any assistance from refugee aid
5

organizations

The AUFBAU joined the defenders of the refugee cause and tried to

prove the usefulness of the new immigrants in several ways.

Grossmann in

a

Kurt

programmatic article in 1940 discussed the main arguments

summarized above, and added that, while only about half of the refugees

3

^

Sophia Robison, Refugees at Work

Dividends from New Americans

,

,

New York, 1941, pp. 37-52.

National Refugee Service, New York

1941, pp.1-5.

^Maurice Davie, The Refugee in America

,

New York, 1948, pp. 136-137.
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were working, all of them were
consumers who would stimulate
the economy
through their demands for goods. 6
In several other Instances
the paper
argued that throughout United
States history Immigration had
always
8
been to the nation's benefit In
the long run.
This thesis was emphasized
by numerous biographical accounts
of German Jewish businessmen who
had
come to this country In the 19th
century and established thriving

businesses in the New World.

7

other stories pointed out the important

roles of many refugees as pioneers in
business or inventors of new

products or manufacturing processes.

In 1939 and in 1940 the paper

began to publish two regular columns entitled
Wir geben Arbeit (We

provide jobs) and Wir bauen auf (We are establishing
ourselves)

,

where

the names of refugee employers and newly founded
refugee businesses

were listed.

9

No way exists to determine whether the efforts of refugee
agencies
to defend the usefulness of the new immigrants from Europe
had any

impact upon the attitudes of restrictionist groups.

The number of

refugees admitted in 1938/39 increased considerably over the previous
year, but this fact was probably due solely to the mounting pressure of
the crisis in Europe.

Slay 17, 40, p.

10

The efforts of the AUFBAU itself certainly had

7;

also Aug. 15, 40, p. 12.

8;

Dec 27, 40, p.

7

May 31, 40,

p.

Slay 3, 30, p. 16; Nov
9

10

1,

40, p.

8;

6;

Apr 11, 41, p.

Aug 13, 43,

p.

Sep 15, 39, p. 26 and following issues irregularly

Wyman, p. 221.

3.

28;

Sep 24, 43, p. 32.
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after their arrival:

first, they had to secure
some kind of job in

order to be able to maintain
themselves.

Secondly, after they had

found work, mostly in unskilled,
low paid positions as domestic

servants, door to door salesmen,
or menial workers, they would
begin to
concentrate their efforts on reaching
a position where they could
make
use of their original skills and
their European experiences in some way

Both problems, finding a job immediately
and working towards reaching
one's former social and occupational
status, were of central concern
to the paper and to the Club, as
they tried in many ways to help the

re fiigees in accommodating themselves
occupationally.

The most important service for the newly arrived
refugees was
the German-Jewish Club's employment agency.

This office existed in

rudimentary form as early as 1934, but it expanded so quickly
in the
following years that by 1940 it could offer 80 placements to about
100
job -hunting refugees each month.

The paper also opened

a

free

advertising column for sales representatives who were looking for new
clients.

Paper and Club gave general advice about the structure of the

job market: what jobs were in demand, where to ask for work, and how

11

Nov 27, 40, p. 14.
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to apply. 12

In its efforts to find
jobs for newly arrived refugees,
the German-

Jewish Club (by then called the
New World Club) also cooperated
with
other refugee agencies, some of
which had extensive job finding
and
job training programs. 13

The National Refugee Service
(NRS)

,

a

central refugee aid agency, founded
and sponsored by American Jewish

organizations in 1939, played
immigrant in this respect.

a

primary role in assisting the new

It, for example,

found work for almost

10,000 newcomers between 1930 and 1940
(however, almost 7000 refugees

were looking for jobs in 1940 alone. 14

This organization operated

throughout the country, cooperating with local
committees which

regularly engaged in systematic job soliciting
efforts. 13
Friends Service Committee,

a

The American

Quaker relief organization, also located

jobs for refugees and organized a "man marketing
service" which advised

refugees on how to go about finding
and how to behave at interviews.

12

a

job, how to fill out applications,

16

,

.

First issue of salesmen column, Dec 27, 40, p. 4; about doctors:
Apr. 1, 39, p. 5; Aug. 15, 39, p. 15; Dec 5, 41, p. 10; Jan 23, 42, p.*4;
March 22, 40, p. 10; nurses: Feb 9, 40, p. 5; June 20, 41, p. 12; lawyers
and accountants: Feb 23, 40, p. 9; musicians: Oct 15, 39, p. 19.
13

Dec 8, 39, pp. 3/4; March 6, 40, p. 10; March 16, 40, p. 5;
March 29, 40, p. 14; May 1, 39, p. 4; March 8, 40, p. 6; Nov 22, 40,
p. 14; Aug 15, 39, p. 15; Apr. 29, 41, p. 5.
14

NRS Annual Report

,

1939, p.

8;

^NRS, Community Service Releases

1940
,

I,

,

p.

7.

July 25, 40, CSR; XV, May 21,

42, part 2.
16

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Bulletin on Refugees
Abroad and at Home, No. 13, Dec 9, 42.

,
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The publications of these
refugee aid agencies provide
considerable
insight into factors influencing
unemployment among refugees. The

main problem lay in the fact
that about two thirds of all adult
male
refugees from Europe had formerly
worked in some kind of white collar
position.

Among German and Austrian refugees,
the percentage of people

whose skills were usually of little
use to them in the United States
was
likely to be even higher. 17 Only the
few skilled workers, and especially
the craftsmen, had no difficulties
in finding jobs and accommodated to
the economic situation rather quickly.

Women also generally had

much better chance of immediate employment than
men.
they were the only supporters of their families
for

domestic servants, governesses, or cooks.

a

In many cases
a

while, working as

18

Age was another important

factor influencing the chances of employment.

Male refugees over 45

years were among the most disadvantaged job seekers.

As the average age

of refugees increased steadily from 1939 throughout the war,
this became
a

serious problem for all refugee aid agencies,

only temporarily solved through the war boom.

a

problem which was

19

The AUFBAU's columns only very indirectly reflect these facts about
the structure of unemployment among refugees.

difficult to derive much of

a

It is therefore

picture of the employment conditions of

most readers from the paper itself.

But, from the Club activities and

the advertisements and announcements in the paper, one can conclude that

^ NRS

Annual Report, 1939

,

p.

6.

^Robison, pp. 68/69; AU Nov 22, 40,
~*~

9

NRS Annual Report, 1940

,

p.

12;

p.

1941

,

14.
p.

7;

1942

p.

10.

.
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many of its readers must
have been professionals,
semi-professionals,
and small business-people

.

Few teachers and intellectuals
seem to have

joined the German- Jewish Club.
As most of these occupational
groups had a relatively low
trans-

ferability of skills, they needed
considerable and systematic assistance
by refugee aid organizations
to readjust themselves
occupationally.
The AUFBAU tried to share this
burden with the major agencies.

The

paper printed numerous articles,
letters, and analyses concerning
the adjustment and assimilation of
professionals;

of independent refugee businesses;
and

ment of refugees.

(3)

(2)

(1)

the establishment

the retraining and resettle-

Each of these three categories merits careful

analysis
(1)

Professionals and semi-professionals usually had

a

good chance

to secure employment in their former kind of
position once institutional

obstacles were overcome and the refugees had acquired some knowledge
of
their field in the United States.

complete retraining for

a

The paper therefore saw no need for

different occupation.

The AUFBAU envisioned

its main task as providing information about the general situation in

professional fields, specifically the legal restrictions concerning

practicing doctors, nurses, lawyers, and public accountants. 20
The German- Jewish Club organized

a

number of special subsections

which were specifically concerned with the occupational readjustment of
several groups of professionals.

By 1941 there was

a

doctor's group,

as well as groups for lawyers, teachers, and laboratory assistants;

20

See Footnote 12.

.
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all of these published their
activities regularly In the paper. 21

Paper and club devoted more
space and Interest to professionals
than to any other occupational
group, although the majority
of the

AUFBAU readers definitely did not
belong to this category.
although professionals comprised only

a

Furthermore,

minority among refugees as

a

whole, other refugee aid organizations
centered many of their activities
around this group as well.

The National Refugee Service, for example,

organized special committees to aid emigre
rabbis, musicians, and
physicians.
.

Affiliated organizations existed for displaced
scholars and

.

social workers.

22

The American Friends Service Committee made
special

efforts to help intellectuals, especially
teachers and research
scientists

23

There are

a

number of reasons why the various institutions cared

so much about intellectuals and professionals.

First of all, this

group definitely needed special assistance to adjust occupationally;
and, as most refugee professionals were highly specialized, a complete

retraining would have been

a

waste of their skills.

On the other hand,

these refugees obviously represented a very desirable class of

immigrants.

Many refugees clearly came from the intellectual elites of

their home countries, and many supporters of refugees, as well as

United States officials, felt that every possible move should be made

Weekly (doctors) or monthly or irregularly (others) in the
advertisement section of the paper.
22

Davie, pp. 134/135. For a survey on professional organizations
see Lyman White, 300,000 New Americans New York, 1957, p. 400.
,

^AFSC, Bulletin No.

4, Jan 20, 42;

No.

13, Dec 9, 42;
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to integrate them into
American academic and professional
life.
(2)

The establishment of independent
businesses was also an

important part of the paper's
educational efforts to promote
refugee
adjustment. Sophia Robison's
Refugees at Work indicates that most
of
the businesses founded and
operated by refugees in the New York
City

area were small scale enterprises.

Many were small retail stores in

the Midtown and upper West Side
sections of Manhattan. 24

Some refugees

had succeeded in transfering larger
amounts of money before they had
left Germany, and had started manufacturing
on a larger scale.

Others

used international connections they had
established in Europe to help

build import or export businesses.

A great number of enterprises

catered mostly to refugees: specialty stores, groceries,
restaurants,
and even some hotels.
4

Others introduced goods into the American market

that had previously been unknown or had to be imported
from Europe,
like leather products or harmonicas and other musical instruments.

Other businesses, such as those in the garment industry, faced few
difficulties adjusting to American market conditions. 25
The AUFBAU reflected the rapid development of an ethnic group of

refugee businesses in its announcements and advertisements of newly
opened refugee ventures that were, for the most part catering mainly
to other refugees.
(3)

Yet for countless new immigrants who had formerly been employed

as managers, bank clerks, or marketing experts, no easy way existed for

0/

^Robison, p. 40, p. 50; Dividends from New Americans
^5

Ibid.

,

pp. 41-52.

,

pp. 4/5.
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fitting into the American
economic system.

Because many of them were

still working in low paid menial
jobs in 1941, the National
Refugee
Service decided to retrain some of
them completely for jobs as skilled
laborers or craftsmen in job categories
that were badly needed by some

industries.

Retraining courses were first held in
New York; but soon

afterwards similar programs were started
in Pittsburgh, Cleveland,

Philadelphia, Baltimore, and many other cities.

The schooling, which

was free, was usually held at local trade
schools.

It lasted from four

weeks (for retraining as domestics) up to six
months and longer (for
dental technicians and upholstering, for example).

Most successful

were the courses held in power sewing machine operating,
like earlier
generations of Jewish immigrants, refugees were thus often
employed in
the garment industry.

promised

a

The courses in furniture finishing and upholstering

stable and rather high income.

26

The AUFBAU greatly approved of the NRS retraining program and it

sponsored similar courses in 1943.

Both the paper and the Club put

strong emphasis on the permanent employment that retraining in such
skills as upholstery, jewelry,

or furniture finishing promised.

They

emphasized these kinds of courses in their information about retraining
and were less attracted by the get-rich-quick philosophy that apparently

underlay the NRS sewing machine or welding courses. 27

Much more enthusiastically welcomed by the paper were the efforts
of the National Refugee Service and many other aid agencies to relocate

26 NRS, CSR, Nos.

^AU

May

8,

7,

42, p.

9,
5;

12,

15,

17,

22.

Jan 22, 43, p. 20.
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refugees fro. New York City
into other parts of the
country,
numerous success stories by and
about resettlers the paper
conveyed to
its readers that through
relocation the refugee gained the
chance to

m

find a job where his European
skills and experience would be
of some
use and where he would consequently
soon find himself in a permanent
and secure position. 2g

This impression stood in some
contrast to the results of the

resettlement process of most refugees.

As the publications of the

various agencies engaged in resettlement
work point out, more than

a

mere geographical relocation of the
refugees and their families was
needed to make resettlement

a

success.

In most cases the chosen

communities had to be matched carefully with the
refugees' wishes, and
in many cases it was not easy to secure
jobs for resettled refugees.

Thus the critical situation of many refugees was not
alleviated merely

by relocation.

As the success of the NRS retraining courses in many

cities outside New York shows, retraining was something many
refugees
had to go through in addition to resettlement.

Indirectly, the paper reflected these complications in numerous
stories about refugees who had (re) settled on the West Coast.

The

reader learned how they earned their living as taxi-cab drivers, dog
groomers, van

movers, or restaurant cooks.

In these stories about life

on the Pacific Coast it never became entirely clear for what reason

former middle class people would turn to such unusual occupations.

28july 21, 44, p. 14; Oct 13, 44, p.
15; Dec 11, 42, p. 15.

15;

Oct 20, 41, p. 27; Feb 20,

^July

14;

Oct 2, 43,

42, p.

2, 43,

p.

13;

March

5,

43, p.

p.

15.
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Was it the lack of alternatives
that made an actor into
a cab driver,
or was it on the contrary
the promise of a high salary
and the challenge
to do something different
that made former lawyers work
in the ship-

yards and housewives into
professional cooks? 30

The reports from West
Coast refugees In the AUFBAU
give the impression that almost
all readers
liked their new jobs but none
of them expected a permanent new
position
from it.

The only instance in which retraining
and resettlement were definitely
and systematically used for attaining
some permanency for the refugees

was through the introduction of some
newcomers to farming.

Agricultural Society of the United States took

a

The Jewish

decided interest in

resettling refugees from central Europe to the
American countryside, in
training them in farming, and in helping them
establish their own farms.
The AUFBAU began to publicize the activities of
this organization as

early as 1938, consistently showing them in

a

very favorable light. 3 ^

In 1940 the paper even published a regular column, der
Landwirt (the

farmer)

,

for some time.

The paper pointed out to its almost exclusively

urban readers how formerly depressed, unemployed, and isolated urban

businessmen had found material and spiritual independence in farming,
thus fulfilling a part of the American dream from which Jews had

usually been excluded.

32

As

a

whole, however, the idea of resettling

on farms was not too attractive to most refugees;

30

Oct.

31 Feb
3

^Sep.

13, 44,

p.

22, 40, p.
1,

39, p.

44;
11;
9;

May
Aug

6,
9,

12.

43, p.
40, p.

Feb 9, 40, p.

only 2500 of them had

3.

1;

July 26, 40, p.

2;

Apr. 11, 41, p. 3.

.

61

chosen to live on farms by 1941.^
Refugees who became farmers, the
AUFBAU suggested, truly conquered
their new home country through
hard work and literally succeeded
In
building up a new existence and
future with their own hands.
Whether
this was true also for the many
other immigrants who had to perform
less

dignifying work is highly doubtful.

The refugees' own stories about

their experiences do not tell much
about their relationship to their work

Most of these stories reflected the thoughts
of inexperienced newcomers

who were more excited by the strengeness
of Americans and the American
way of life than with the job itself, which
usually offered few
original experiences. 3 ^

Identification with their work as

a

fulfilling

and dignifying experience was voiced only by
refugees who had gone

through retraining courses or by those who worked in the
defense

industries

35

Rather striking was the lack in all these accounts of any information or opinions about American fellow workers.

refugees working was an isolated rather than

Americanizing) experience,

a

socializing (or

a

fact underlined by the publications of the
<5

American Friends Service Committee.

r

Language difficulties were an

important part of this deplorable isolation.

3

Apparently, for most

In many cases American

^White, p. 55.

34

,
Column
Crosstown starts May 1, 39, and appears regularly for 6
months; also Feb 9, 40, p. 10; March 22, 40, p. 5; June 28, 40, p. 11;
Jan 3, 41, p. 18; March 22, 40, p. 16.

33

Aug 8, 41,

p.

19;

Oct. 2, 42, p. 15; Nov. 21, 41, p.

42, p. 32.
Of.

Esp. AFSC

,

Bulletin

,

No.

14, May 12, 43.

8;

March 20,

7
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trade unions refused to
admit refugees, which
prohibited not only

occupational adjustment but
probably social contacts as
well. 37
The AUFBAU made conscious
attempts to alleviate this
situation
for the working refugees,
in spring 1940 Siegfried
Aufhauser,

notable German emigre' labor
expert and member of the Social
Democratic
party, began to write a regular
column. Review of Labor where the
,

peculiarities of the American trade
union system and labor legislation
as it applied to the refugees
were discussed.

Aufhauser also

published encouraging reports about
refugees who had joined or

organized union locals successfully. 38
But these signs of emancipation and structural
assimilation of
the refugees as workers were apparently rare.

Many middle class

refugees who had to work in blue collar jobs before
and during the war

were probably not interested in labor organization at all.

They did

not wish to give their working class positions the look
of permanency.

Many refugees also felt a genuine frustration as dependency on
institutional aid and

a

general economic and psychological insecurity

prevailed in their lives.

Even the optimistic AUFBAU had to face these

somber realities from time to time.

Especially in the 1930s and the

early 40s the paper had frequently to discuss the generally depressed
state of mind of the immigrants.

3

A number of refugees who felt that

Feb 9, 40, p. 2.

3 ®March

7, 41, p. 5; Nov 1, 40, p. 8; Nov 22, 40, p. 14;
40, p. 2 are some early examples.

Feb 9,
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they were able no longer
to face the hardships
of social readjustment
even committed suicide, the
paper reported. 39

39

0

e

a

difflcuUies most re£ugees Sad
the AFSC B ulletins, esp.
Nos.

UntS
7
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CHAPTER

VI

PATTERNS OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT:
CITIES AND THE COUNTRYSIDE

A very real dilemma that faced
the AUFBAU and most refugee
organizations arose from the fact that
about half of the refugees
chose to stay in New York, their
1
port of entry.

mainly because of its European way
of life.

The city attracted them

Numerous ethnic groups

that lived there offered a halfway
station to Americanization for

immigrants from many parts of Europe.

On the other hand, employment

possibilities and the general outlook for
assimilation to the American
social system were in many ways extremely
unfavorable in New York City.
Still, many refugees stubbornly refused to
move for fear of being

completely isolated elsewhere and deprived of any
possibility of

maintaining contacts with fellow immigrants.
The AUFBAU itself reflected this dilemma very acutely,
as the vast

majority of its readers lived in New York City.

Extensive parts of

the paper were devoted to life in New York, its enjoyments and problems.

Newly arrived refugees from Germany were usually pleasantly overwhelmed by New York's glittering facade and its seemingly unlimited
possibilities for the newcomer.

Suddenly the depressed and dreary life

in the urban centers of Europe were only bad memories and America's
O

shiny cities were the overwhelming reality.

As one refugee child said:

"There are so many lights, like a birthday cake, red, blue, yellow, and

^Maurice Davie, Refugees in America

^Lyman White, 300,000 New Americans
^Feb 7, 41, p.

7;

Jan 35, p. 5.

,

,

New York, 1947,

p.

80.

New York, 1957, pp. 40ff, pp. 318ff.

.
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white, and they burn all night
and nobody Is alrald the
airplane will
come
As the AUFBAU was steadily
read by more and more immigrants
who

established themselves in New York
permanently, the paper and also the
German Jewish Club developed an almost
scientific interest in the ways
the city functioned: its political
system, its history, and its

hidden beauties.

In articles about important local
politicians such as

Fiorello LaGuardia, Robert F. Wagner, and
Stanley Isaacs (borough

president of Manhattan)

.

The AUFBAU tried to evoke some political

identification with New York among its readers.

5

In regular columns

entitled "New Yorker Notizbuch" (New Yorker Notebook),
"Crosstown," and
Girl about Town," AUFBAU journalists perceptively
recorded their

observations about the varied ways of life in the city. 6

From summer 1941 on throughout the war, AUFBAU readers received
suggestions for exploring the city and its surroundings on their own in
trips to New York's different neighborhoods and landmarks. ^

The

history of New York was the topic of an extensive lecture program that
the German- Jewish Club started in 1941

throughout the war.

^AFSC Bulletin
5

arid

which remained

a

big success

It offered lectures and guided tours through the

,

Dec 29, 40, p.

No. 7, p. 2.
1;

Oct 32, 41, p.

6;

Dec 27, 40, p.

5.

£

"Crosstown": Summer and Fall 1939; "New Yorker Notizbuch," throughout
the paper, starting 1938; "Girl about Town," irregularly after Dec 1941.
^

"Within 20 miles" (Hans Hacker) appears regularly except during the
Winter.

^
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cifc y

a

H

Club members

.

The AUFBAU certainly did
its best to create among
the refugees a
sense of conscious
identification with this rather
untypical African
City.
This was of special importance
to the many refugees in
New York
who lived a rather isolated
existence. By 1939 refugees
from Austria
and Germany had settled
in such large numbers in
the city that they
formed something like an
autonomous ethnic subculture there.
In

certain sections of the city,
especially in Washington Heights, they
lished gathering points (the cafes
on the upper West side) and
9
they had their own newspaper
(the AUFBAU).

But the paper looked on

these special forms of New Yorkization
with mixed feelings.

The

development of a little Berlin or Vienna
did not seem to promote the

much heralded Americanization of the
refugee.

The paper therefore

either consistently ignored many parts of
this refugee ethnicity or

explicitly discouraged its readers from becoming
10
part of it.
But much of the city's glamour and diversity
was not accessible at
all to the refugees.

For many of them the city as

a

whole was too

large, too complicated, and too fast moving and
competitive.

As

several stories in the paper testify, many refugees found
it almost

impossible to develop permanency and security in New York City.

worst of all, in the AUFBAU'

s

But

opinion, was the conviction that staying

there prevented assimilation to the American way of life for many

"This is your city" starts in Nov. 1940.
9

Judd Teller, Strangers and Natives, New York 1968, p. 4.
10

Dec 27, 40, pp. 3/4; Nov 15, 39, p. 20.
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refugees.

This reasoning clearly points
towards a somewhat schisophrenic

attitude on the part of the
paper.

On the one hand, most of its

readers lived in New York and
apparently appreciated this in many
ways
and succeeded in developing
personal ties to the city. On the
other
hand, the paper saw its efforts
to Americanize the refugees
imperiled
by the segregation and isolation
that many refugees experienced
there.
The magic pull of New York was

a

problem not only for the AUFBAU,

but almost all refugee agencies
were confronted with it as well.
1939 the National Refugee Service began
to organize

systematic resettlement program.

a

In

large scale

It was based on the idea that, although

many refugees lived in New York and wanted to
settle there, the chances
of achieving any degree of social and economic
stability there were

minimal for many of them, as were their general prospects
for becoming
Americanized.

The National Refugee Service wanted to offer the new

immigrants from Europe an alternative way of settlement

them better prospects of integration.

which would bring

More than 800 local resettlement

centers in cities throughout the country were therefore developed by the
NRS.

These groups consisted mainly of representatives of the local

Jewish communities.

Each of them pledged to take care of

a

certain

number of newly arrived refugees each year; find jobs for them and
provide housing and financial assistance if necessary.

The central

agency tried to match the wishes and needs of each community carefully

with those of the refugees.

U July
12

37, p.

6;

March

12

Resettlement centers were distributed

8,

40, p.

6.

Wh ite, op. cit., Ch. XII passim.
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rather evenly throughout the
country; m ost of them were
Located In smaller
towns or middle sited cities.
The Southern states were slightly
underrepresented;

the North Eastern and North
Central states were somewhat

favored as resettlement areas. 13
But the program met considerable
resistance from refugees who,

once settled in New York, were
unwilling to move again to places they

had never heard of.

During the peak years of immigration,
from 1939

to 1941, the National Refugee
Service made participation in the resettle-

ment program mandatory for all immigrants
who wanted to use the migration
services of the NRS

.

Still, only about 11% of all refugees from
Europe

who came at that time were resettled outside
1^
New York City.
For most of those who did participate, the program
seemed to work

rather well in opening viable alternatives to life in New
York City.

Eventual difficulties arose mainly from the contradictory ideology
on which the NRS based its activities.

The agency's foremost goal was

to provide the refugee with a chance to assimilate to American
society.

Yet it also wanted to make every effort to preserve the immigrant's ties
to his Jewish heritage.

This led to conflicts with some Jewish communities.

Many refugees did not fit into the often overly narrow restrictions
that the local committees set for selecting immigrants; older people or

orthodox Jews were especially unlikely to be welcomed by many communities.
Sometimes resettlement committees even refused to take any more
resettlers.

In theory, the National Refugee Service also wanted to

^NRS, Annual Report 1939,
14

p.

18.

White, op. cit., pp. 315-317, p. 332.

^
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grant the immigrant

a

genuine choice of where to go;
in practice,

however, it had to resort to
rather coercive measures to make
the
15
resettlement program work at all.
One major problem, which was
probably unavoidable in such

large

a

scale enterprise, was the often
impersonal nature of the National

Refugee Service's assistance.

This becomes clear by contrasting
NRS

efficiency with the more personalized,
small scale efforts of the

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
to resettle refugees throughout
the country.

The AFSC had very limited financial means
and operated on

a small and rather selective basis.

For the few refugees it could take

care of, it was nevertheless very helpful. 16

in general its activities

were not geared towards any systematic relocation or
retraining plan.
Instead, personalized services and counseling were emphasized.

Most

effective and appreciated by AUFBAU readers seemed to have been the
AFSC

Americanization hostels for newly arrived immigrants and the summer
vacation programs organized for tired refugee New Yorkers.

In New

York and Philadelphia the Friends also made decided efforts to bring
refugees and Americans together for social events.

In some cases

American host families took care of refugees on an individual basis
until the newcomers had adjusted themselves fully.
In its own way the AUFBAU too tried to play an active part in the

resettlement activities.

l-Hjhite, op. cit. pp.

Besides propagandizing the resettlement idea

311, 312, 321 and Zosa Szajkowski, "The

Attitude of American Jews to Refugees," in American Jewish Historical
Quarterly Dec. 1971, pp. 132f.
,

16 May
1

8, 41,

p.

14.

^AFSC Bulletins, Nos. 1, 4,

7,

13,

14,

16,

18.
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and informing readers about
the activities of NRS and
AFSC, It published
a

resettlement column "Soil Ich in de
n Westen gehen? " (shall

West?)

.

Here a reader from Oregon, himself

a

I

go

resettled refugee answered

frequently asked questions about
resettlement on the West Coast. 18
Many individual articles, most of
them printed in the Westkuste (West
coast) pages, provided AUFBAU readers
with general information about
19
life at the other end of the United
States.

But neither paper nor

Club ever attempted to initiate any
organized resettlement activities
on their own.

Difficult questions or requests for further aid were

usually referred to the local NRS committees,
Jewish organizations, or
local Chambers of Commerce.

At least as important as factual accounts of resettlement
were
the enthusiastic reports of refugees who had resettled
successfully.

Compared to the sophisticated articles about life in New York, these
stories read like naive tales from a far away wonderland, even though
they came from places only a few hours from the city.

Usually these

accounts were too rose-tinted to give any clear picture of what the

American hinterland was really like.

Resettlers preferred to stress

the general impression that anybody could find a better life almost

anywhere in the country outside New York.

For most of these happy

immigrants better job opportunities and more social contacts with

Americans had almost automatically resulted from resettlement.

Only

after moving away from New York City could the refugee face the real

1

8

Starts in Sep 1940s and continues irregularly every

^"West Coast": Feb

2

to 4 weeks.

Dec 11, 42, p. 15; Aug 7, 42,
p. 15; July 7, 43, p. 15; July 7. 43, p. 14; other places: Nov 19, 23,
p. 26; Nov. 26, p. 25 (Chicago); Dec 3, 43, p. 29 (Wisconsin); Jan 28,
44, p. 24; Feb. 4, 44, p. 30 (Philadelphia).
20, 42, p.

15;
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challenges of life in America and
make a total break with his
European
past, these readers stated. 20
Some characteristics of American
small town life stood out particu-

m

larly

all these enthusiastic articles.

were often helped on

a

Newly arrived refugees

very personal basis by local Jewish
organizations.

They were not treated as charity
recipients, but as newcomers who
were given

chance to help themselves to

a

a

certain extent.

For many

immigrants, socialization and the establishment
of personal relationships

with other Americans became possible for the first
time since they
had arrived in America.
The great physical comfort of most refugees who had moved
away

from the urban areas was also discernable from these reports.

The

whole pace of life was more modest in the country, and the physical
and social structure of the new environment easily became familiar and

remained unchanged.

permanency,

a

This gave life in the hinterland the look of

look which was enhanced through a general feeling of

closeness to nature.
This perception of

a

paradise-like physical environment was

especially stressed by those refugees who had settled on the California
coast.

But until 1942 California resettlers were confronted with the

sharp contrast between the abundance of nature and the depressed

economic circumstances in which most of them found themselves.

Life

in California, the AUFBAU reader could learn, was an odd mixture of

20

Dec 5, 41, p. 40; Dec 11, 42, p. 15.

^March

38, pp.

6/7;

Feb 20, 42, p. 15.

^
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some of the worst evils of
urban life and the best advantages
of the

countryside.

22

Readers from California, therefore,
usually did not show the
usual enthusiasm for resettlement.

The somewhat gloomy tone of most

articles from the West Coast became
even stronger during 1942 when

stringent curfew laws were imposed on most
refugees who lived there.

Enemy aliens (and Japanese Americans) had
to stay in their homes from
8 p.m.

to 6 a.m. every day and were not allowed
to go more than five

miles beyond their homes at all.

This measure heightened the isolation

of many refugees from each other, a problem that
had plagued some of
the new immigrants there before.

But by 1943, when the curfew was abolished, 2

/

the West Coast

quickly acquired the golden colored image of the land of opportunity in
the pages of the AUFBAU.

The war boom on the Pacific created plenty of

well paid jobs for the refugees and from 1943 on, West Coast readers

definitely urged easterners to move west. 25

Only a few readers wondered

what would happen to them when the war boom was over and their jobs
gone.

Would

new depression haunt the golden west, or would the

a

refugees soon acquire
them from

a

stable middle class position that would shelter

a

new uprooting experience?

26

22

Sep 4, 40, p. 21; Nov 14, 41, p. 114; Nov 28, 41, p. 15 May 17, 42,

^Dec
42, p.

1;

1,

43, p.

2~*June 26,
19.

7;

5.

43, p.

15;

44, p.

26

1

Jan 9, 42, p. 16; Feb 6, 42, p. 15; Feb 13,
p. 3; Apr 3, 42, p. 17; Apr 17, 42, p. 17, Radkau, p. 109

19, 41, p.
Mar 13, 42,

^ Jan

p.

Apr 14, 44, p. 19.

July 10, 43, p. 17; Aug

7,

43, p.

15;

Apr 14
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CHAPTER

VII

WOMEN, YOUNG PEOPLE, AND THE
CHANGE IN FAMILY STRUCTURE

Among the refugees as
position.

a group,

women and children held

a

special

In absolute numbers they constituted
a majority, but as a

rule they were confronted with more
than the usual amount of changes
and conflicting images about their
social positions.^

The paper

reflected an awareness of these special
problems in that it allocated

definite space to the discussion of issues
facing women and children.
Women, as the AUFBAU portrayed them, could
clearly be divided
into three different groups which appeared in
different parts of the

paper and seemingly had nothing to do with each other.

In the first

pages the reader found articles about women who were
nationally known

because of their political positions or their fame as movie-stars,
artists, or musicians.

In the back pages of the AUFBAU, problems in

the lives of refugee women formed the subject of discussion in mnay

articles.

Finally, a synthetic portrait of "the American woman" was

attempted on the special page "Fur die Frau" (for women)
The celebrities among American women usually appeared as distant

stars whose lives had no direct impact upon the everyday routine of the

female AUFBAU reader.

They served as far off, idolized models.

Women

engaged in political activities were also seen as spokespersons for an

otherwise silent majority.

Many of them were representatives or at

least active supporters of the refugees.

In this role they appealed

^Kurt Grossmann, Arieh Tartakower, The Jewish Refugee
1944, pp. 358/59.

,

New York
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to the general public as
crusaders for the refugees’ plight.

Eleanor

Roosevelt and Dorothy Thompson
were among the most active political
women portrayed in the AUFBAU.
Thomas Mann’s daughter, Erika,
played
an important role as a representative
of the intellectual migration. 2

A number of women were presented by the
AUFBAU as foremost representatives of the American Jewish community,
including Lillian Wald,

Bella Spewack, and Rachel Vixmann.

3

Usually these women were described

and discussed no differently than men.

The assessment of their

achievements and importance rested exclusively on
political factors.

Movie-stars and female artists were even more out of
touch with
the life of the average AUFBAU reader than the
professional women.

Their appeal usually had no political flavor (emigre
actresses like

Marlene Dietrich and Louise Rainer were exceptions).^

They were mostly

admired as glamorous inhabitants of the far away fairy-tale world
in

Hollywood.

The glorification of these beauty queens should not have

been new to most AUFBAU readers.

In this respect the culture of the

Weimar Republic had already been thoroughly Americanized.
In the back pages of the AUFBAU a distinctly different image of

women emerged from stories about the everyday life of female refugees.
These narratives showed that in many ways their process of adjustment
was harder than that of most men.

2

Aug. 30, 40, p. 20;
43, p. 24.
3

July 5, 40, p.

3;

'Siarch 1, 40, p. 4.

Many women had only known relatively

July 5, 40, p.

May 31, 40,

p.

3;

20;

May 31, 40, p.

20;

Oct 17, 41, p. 24.

Dec 18,
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carefree lives as middle-class
housewives in Europe.

They had never

held paid jobs, nor had they
received any practical training.

While
the husband supported the
family, housekeeping and child
rearing were

considered to be the only appropriate
tasks for married women; most
of them even had domestic servants
to help with this.
The critical financial situation facing
the refugees upon their

arrival in the United States forced most
families to change this order
in basic ways.

In a majority of cases both husband and
wife had to

find jobs in order to be able to support
the family.

Often enough

women found work as domestic servants much sooner
than their over
qualified husbands.
factory-workers.

Other women became saleswomen, typists, or
Those who had learned trades usually found jobs

rather easily as tailors, milliners, or hairdressers

.

^

Others made

use of the opportunities to acquire skills as seamstresses, bakers,
or

beauticians, with the help of the National Refugee Service. ^
found chances to open businesses of their own.

A few even

g

The new importance of

women as supporters of the family created difficult problems for refugee

husbands and fathers because of the resulting decline in their own
position.

5

The AUFBAU, however, did not discuss this issue, but focused

Nov 22, 40, p. 14.

^Apr.

18, 41, p.

12;

Sep.

26, 41, p.

12.

^Nov 22, 40, p. 14.
Q

National Refugee Service, Community Service Releases; Employment
and Retraining, Nos. 7, 9, 12, 15, 18, 22 (February -November 1941).
9

This can be learned from the numerous advertisements in the AUFBAU
for beauty parlors, tailors, and other businesses run by refugee women.

^

.
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on the difficulties women
had in adapting to their
changed roles.

The pages of the AUFBAU do
not make it entirely clear how
well

women adjusted to their new
position as wage earners.

In the pre-war

years most of them looked upon
themselves as overworked housewives
and
mothers engaged in an heroic struggle
to keep the family financially

independent and emotionally stable.

A positive relationship to the

paid work they did was hardly possible
under such overwhelming

pressures

10

Secondary sources place

somewhat different emphasis on the

a

refugee women's changed role.
refugees had in adjusting to
ing social mobility.

Compared to the difficulties most male
status loss, their wives showed outstand-

a

Women usually had much more willpower in over-

coming initial difficulties and they held low status
jobs without fear
of losing their personal dignity.

Most of them also showed considerable

inventiveness and talent for improvisation in changing from the ways the
family had functioned traditionally

.

But these changing attitudes were reflected in

limited way in

a

the innumerable articles that appeared on household organization and

fashion matters in the AUFBAU'

s

women's pages.

These parts of the

paper suggested that Americanization for the refugee woman meant,
primarily, a reorganization of the household,

^Apr.

5,

40, p.

8;

a

change of the family's

Dec 22, 44, p. 26.

^Maurice Davie, The Refugee in the United States New York 1948,
124/125; Donald P. Kent, The Refugee Intellectual New York 1943,
p. 211.
,

pp.

,

2
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eating habits, and

a

different way of dressing. 12

what made the

American woman different from
the refugee housewife, in
these pages,
»as not so much her different
position as a wage earner, but
merely her
appearance as a perfect hostess, up
to date in fashion matters,
and a

13
competent manager of household and
family.

The AUFBAU's idea of American
womanhood changed decisively during
the war years.

Then women, as well as children and
men, were all

equally engaged in the war effort.
even the last country kitchen.

The anti-fascist fight reached

For the AUFBAU this meant that women,

like everyone else, were seen in a
larger social and political context,

rather than as something special and separate.

particular were encouraged to find
Defense or the Red Cross. 4

a

Refugee housewives in

job or to volunteer for the Civil

If they wanted to stay with their families,

they were advised by the paper to take care of
children of mothers who
.

.

were working.

15

Even the food and fashion columns took on

a

new shape.

Like all American women, AUFBAU readers received extensive
advice

concerning the saving of food and other materials; every empty can was
a

bullet against Hitler, the paper reminded its readers. 16

not abolished, but it expressed the spirit of the times.

1

Fashion was

Women wore

,

Women s page starts in Nov. 1940, and contains regular columns
about fashion and household organization. Table manners in U.S. are
discussed in Dec. 4, 42, p. 11.
13

May 17, 40,

l4

15

16

p.

July 14, 42, p.

10.
17;

Jan. 8, 42, p.16;

Jan 22, 43, p. 9.

Aug 26, 42, p. 19.
0ct 9, 42, p. 21; Oct. 23, 42,

p.

21;

Nov. 6, 42, p. 11.
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uniform- like garments and the
AUFBAU appropriately discussed
the question
17
of how to dress for war bond
drives.

During the war, women workers became
the focus of attention, as
suddenly they were a badly needed
addition to the work force; a host of
well paid factory jobs opened to
them.
Women began to unionize and
demand equal pay for equal work.

Some women, the AUFBAU reported,

even took over the businesses of their
husbands while the latter went
into the Army. 19

Others did not want to confine themselves to
work on

the homefront and joined the Women's
Army Corps. 20

The achievements

and new roles of these women were generally
understood to be patriotic

contributions to the war effort of the Nations.
Occasionally, however, the AUFBAU' s women editors celebrated the
basic changes in attitudes and roles of American as well
as refugee
women.

They admitted that, in their view, refugee women especially

had encountered

a

fundamentally new view of their own femininity that

was shaped by the changing position of women in the United States during
the Depression and war years.

longer

a

The beautiful but idle housewife was no

desirable image for women, the paper stated with satisfaction;

instead, the uncomplicated, practical, hard working "girl" was what

every woman wanted to be.

May

1,

42, p.

16, p.

Every woman held

22;

Aug

7,

a job;

42, p.

even housewives

18.

18

Sep. 3, 43, p. 19; Richard Polenberg, War And Society New York
1972, pp. 146-148; Richard Lingeman, Don't You Know There's A War On?
New York 1970, pp. 148 ff.
,

1

9

20

Aug. 4, 44, p. 18; Lingeman, p. 155/156.

Jan 29, 43, p. 22; Aug 22, 43, p. 17.
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considered themselves as having
a regular profession. 21
The recognition of basic
changes in the role of women in
America
was signalled even more clearly
in the increasing prominence
of women

professionals in the paper.

In 1943 the AUFBAU portrayed
a number of

important women journalists in

regular series.

a

Helen Gahagan, Claire

Boothe Luce, and Bette Davis were
other prominent women whose achievements

were discussed in the paper. 22

the notable difference between these

articles and the traditional coverage
of female politicians was that

women were no longer seen as sexless
political figures, but as foremost
representatives of their own sex.
This development of an independent position for
most women was

a

clear danger to true American womanhood, warned
Professor Eric Mosse
in comments made in the late 1943 to the
students of Hunter College.

Without adverse comment, the AUFBAU recorded his opinions on
the dangers
of an increasing masculinity of women in wartime America. 23

But any

such fears were decidedly premature, as the wartime change in the

position of refugee women turned out to be rather temporary in nature.
The AUFBAU observed accurately that in 1944

a

considerable number of

women were among the first workers to be dismissed as the war boom
slowed;

the differences between men's and women's wages also increased
,

as the economy eased.

24

21

Nov. 21, 41, p.
22

„

3;

,

Feb.

19,

43, p.

17.

Aug. 6, 43, p. 19; July 28, 44, p. 19; Journalist series starts
July 43 and ends in Oct 43.
23
2t

Nov.

19, 43, p.

17.

Aug. 25, 44, p. 19.
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What was the overall perspective
of the women refugees then?
Women's page editor Vera Greener
offered a rather pragmatic
assessment
Of the situation In December
1944.
She contended that refugee
women
were probably the class of
refugees for whom life had changed
most
radically through the emigration
experience. But, although their
self-reliance and their self confidence
had Increased in most cases,
they saw no need to reassess their
position as women in any fundamental
way.

They were busy enough balancing their
basic needs with the demands

of their families, while trying to
fit into the somewhat different role
of the American woman.

9S

If the changes that affected women were only
partly of a basic

nature, the different position of children in
this country certainly

affected the whole structure of refugee families in

a

fundamental way.

Differences between the old and the new world in the upbringing
of

children touched on many fundamental issues of assimilation and

acculturation of refugee families.
Children who had reached the United States together with their
parents (this became more and more rare during the war years) were

usually

a

heavy burden on their families.

As many youngsters had gone

through rather traumatic experiences in Europe, many needed special
care in being introduced to the different ways of life in the new

homecountry.

26

Yet professional help was generally not available to

them, and even the parents themselves were usually unable to devote

2

^Dec.

26

Sep

.

22, 44, p.

26.

19, 41,

19;

p.

July 10, 42, p. 32.
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much time to their children.

They had to earn

a

living and often

enough they were forced to
place their children in institutions
or
with foster parents, at least for
some time after their arrival. 27
Financial need was among the main
problems of families with children.
The German- Jewish Club's social
worker therefore often received

requests for advice from refugee youths
who did not know how to deal

with the social isolation that stemmed
from the fact that most of
them did not have enough money to associate
freely with their American
peers.

They could not go out to the movies, invite
girls out for

28
dates, or go to summer camp like their friends
did.

Often the desire to achieve

a

more independent financial position,

as well as the pressing economic problems of the
parents, caused

refugee teenagers to leave school prematurely and take work
as unskilled
laborers.

Especially during the war years, when such jobs were easily

available and well paid, the AUFBAU repeatedly urged refugee parents to
do everything possible to provide their children with a good education. 29

News about the increasing lack of discipline in schools and the rapid
rise of juvenile delinquency throughout the country were alarming signs
to the paper that pointed to a lack of parental supervision and a

decaying family order in general. 30

^May
28
29

Apr.

24, 40,

May 16, 40,

p.
p.

9.

5;

Apr.

19, 40,

p.

17.

Dec 8, 39, p. 11; Oct 25, 40, p. 10;
11, 41, p. 5; Sep. 22, 43, p. 16.

Feb 38, p.

11;

Feb 37, p.

Qf)

pp.

Jan. 2, 43, p. 4; Dec 14, 43, p. 21; Dec. 25, 43, p.
87-89; Polenberg, pp. 149/150.

4;

2;

Lingeman,
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The most significant problem
in relation to the role
of refugee

children, however, seems to have
originated from different trends.
In
most cases the children proved
to be more quickly and easily
Americanized
than their parents.
They established a basis for the
future cultural
31
and structural assimilation of
the refugees.
Thus the AUFBAU as
,

well as secondary sources, portrayed
refugee children as the most

generally successful group of refugees.
of all charitable efforts;

about their new country.

They were thankful recipients

they did not criticize much or complain
They did not shut themselves off, but learned

the language quickly and associated freely
with other American children.

Obviously they also did not take jobs away from
Americans and consequently
it hurt nobody to point out the achievements
of these young future

Americans.

The AUFBAU published innumerable patriotic hymns, speeches,

and articles by and about refugee children. 32
a

Children were symbols of

better future.
But the exemplary adjustment and the near-perfect assimilation of

their children posed serious problems for most refugee parents.

Many

of the difficulties with overly independent children and teenagers thus

attained

a

larger social dimension.

Was it acceptable for half grown

youths to go out on their own, or to find their own jobs?

really be sent away alone to go to summer camp?

Could children

The social worker who

discussed these problems in the paper tried to point out that such

independence of children was

^Feb
32

Dec.

38, p.

11;

13, 40, p.

a

natural thing, since in America young

Oct 25, 40, p. 10; Davie Ch. XIII passim.
3;

Dec 29, 39, pp. 1/2; Sep. 6, 40, p.

2.
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people enjoyed considerable
freedon, fro. parental authority
fro m an
early age on. Moreover, the
special situation of most refugee
families
forced many youths to stand on
their own feet, often they
turned out
to be the main help for the
parent's adjustment, thus changing
the

pattern of responsibility and authority
in the family. 33
This was seen as such

a

serious problem to many AUFBAU readers

that the German-Jewish Club organized
a conference on the problems
and

position of young refugees.

The problems of course were more those
of

34
the parents than those of the youngsters
themselves.

The AUFBAU does

not discuss the results of this meeting,
but one can presume that the

refugees took the opportunity to compare some
of the basically different

patterns that shaped family life in Germany and
in the United States.

While the European middle class family was

a

tightly knit unit that

provided not only protection and emotional warmth for the
children,
but also a great part of their education, the refugees found

professionalized educational system in the United States.

a

largely

Public

schools and other institutions took care of all school-age children

from morning to night.

And youngsters were encouraged to spend their

leisure time with people their own age, joining various clubs for
sports or social activities.

mainly by

a

The idea that children were educated

professional class of educators and their own peers must

have been difficult to accept for many European parents since it

diminished their role as the major authorities in the education of

33
^

0ct 25, 41, p. 10; Dec. 8, 39, p. 11.

May 23, 41,

p.

4;

May 30, 41,

p.

4.
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35

their children

In an intriguing effort to
cope with these very problems,
the

Club founded its own youth
group within the German- Jewish
Club.

Presumably this presented an answer
in

a

twofold way.

Young people

had their own independent
organization, and the idea of American

peer education was followed in
principle.

All activities of this

youth group, however remained under the
auspices of the adult organization with its rather solid European
outlook on education and culture.

The family situation of the refugees reflected
the overall dilemma
of the new immigrants.

They tried to avoid all conspicuousness and,

rejecting the slow path of Americanization that
previous generations of
immigrants had taken, they tried to appear American
from their first
day on.

But this deliberate attempt to look and behave as American
as

possible led to a distortion of the refugees' image of themselves.

In

actuality, the new immigrants quite often showed signs of definite

ethnic behavior in their manners and in their employment and settlement
patterns.

But they themselves did not recognize the fact that in many

ways they were not so different from previous groups of immigrants.

In

some instances the AUFBAU openly criticized the behavior of many refugees
as non-American.

Problems relating to the different understanding of

social and family life among refugees were also frankly discussed at
times.

But other factors pointing toward an ethnic pattern of assimila-

^“*Davie, pp.

147/8.

"^Oct. 31 42, p. 5 (group is founded); Feb 20, 42, p. 13 (first
issues of youth page); June 2, 42, p. 15.
}

85

tion, such as the preferences
for certain professions and
settlement
g'

ns, were largely ignored or only
brought up in connection with

general economic questions.

Such limited perspectives and distortions

determined not only the perception refugees
had of themselves, but also
their view of America and American
society.

PART II.

THE REFUGEES LOOK AT AMERICA

.

^

.
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CHAPTER

VIII

AUFBAU AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
ORDER
For most refugees the encounter
with America as

was individual and deeply emotional.

a

new home country

In story after story about the

initial impressions of newly arrived
refugees, the smiling face of

America's social and political order
was the dominant theme.

Friendly

contacts with bureaucracies and the
general "take-it easy" attitudes of
the population impressed the newcomers
from authoritarian Europe.

All

these experiences were invariably connected
with the refugees' under-

standing of the meaning of democracy and freedom
1
in the New World.
"America is Different" was appropriately the title
of an AUFBAU column

which talked about everyday encounters with Americans
and their society.
The author of this series tried to prove that a democratic
political

order as established in the United States produced better
individual
citizens, especially friendlier ones, and a more humane environment

.

The paper approached most events in American history from the same

emotion-based and personalized perspective.
Lincoln, were literally held as saints. 3

Washington, and especially

Such national celebrations as

the Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, and Labor Day were regarded as

opportunities for every immigrant to show his strong emotional dedication
to the American system.

The AUFBAU'

s

articles for the national holidays

made it look as though the immigrants identified with the American past

Jan. 35, p.

Feb

5;

Dec

27,

39, p

.

3.

Feb

14, 41, p

.

4.
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because they themselves had
taken part in creating it. 4

This use of

American history as an emotional
homestead which gave the immigrants
the possibility of identifying
closely with basic American
patriotism

was of course in the best American
tradition.

The idea of being in

line with previous historical
events was also of special importance

during the war years when the refugees
were in particular need of

a

reassuring ideological identity.
Not only the American past, but also
the present political system

became one of the very centers of the
unquestionable goodness of the
United States as a homeland.

The refugees voiced criticisms of various

aspects of American life, its mass culture or its
social structure, for
example.

But they never doubted that the American political
system was

the embodiment of the American democratic ideal.

They therefore

believed unconditionally that all actions of the elected government
were serving the interest of the people at all times.
In the discussion of everyday politics such a position was hard for

any openminded newspaper to adhere to.

If all actions of the government

were in the people's interest, was the elected majority then automatically
the representative of the absolute good in politics?

Initially the

AUFBAU tried to solve the problems arising from the obvious discrepancy
of democracy in theory and practice in a very simple fashion:

the paper

declared that it would remain aloof from all politics whatsoever.

As

late as December 1939 and February 1940, the editors expressed as a

statement of policy: "We will hold up freedom and democracy, we will

^July

5,

40, p.

7;

Sep. 6, 40, p.

2;

Nov. 22, 40, p.

3;

Sep. 4, 42, pp.

1-

^

^
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avoid politics and all quarrels
about political questions of the
5
day."
Needless to say, by the time the
declaration was made many Important

political questions of the day. Including
the position of American
Judaism, the refugee problem, and
anti-Semitism, had already been

discussed extensively in the paper.
But in fact, the apolitical line of the
AUFBAU had remained consistent throughout the thirties insofar as the
domestic political scene

was concerned.

The two main topics of the times, the Depression
and

the New Deal, were only mentioned in indirect
ways.

The Depression

formed the background of many discouraging stories about
refugees looking
for work.
1939.

But the New Deal was only described once, very briefly, in

Otherwise, domestic politics remained rather obscure until 1940.
The AUFBAU 's concern with foreign affairs, on the other hand, had

become strong by 1938/1939.

The increasing danger of war during the

multiplying crises in Europe and Asia was frequently discussed, and
especially those events connected with the refugee question were recorded
quite regularly in the paper.

Clearly the AUFBAU had broken its general

"no politics" vow long before 1940.

But discussion of American domestic politics clearly required

a

more direct political commitment than did expression of views on world
events.

A careful and sometimes successful way out of the paper's

obvious fear of being caught up in quarrels about politics was to offer

^Dec

.

^Aug.

8,

39, p.

16;

1,

39, p.

3.

^June 36, p.

4;

Feb.

16, 40, p.

6;

(also Dec. 34, p. 3).

July 15, 39, pp. 1/2; Sep. 15, 39, pp. 1/2.
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purely descriptive reports about
the American political system,
thus
an article "Unpolltlsches
uber die Amerlkanische Verfassung”
("Nonpolitical Comments about the American
Constitution") that appeared in
early 1935 conformed to the
political abstinence principle, yet
It also

provided the refugee with some basic
information about his new home
8
country.
Following the same descriptive fashion,
numerous articles
about the government and the political
system appeared throughout the

war years.

They were mostly aimed at teaching the
ignorant newcomer

9
some basics about the form and meaning of
democracy.

In 1944, for

example, the paper printed a series aimed at
preparing the refugee for

his citizenship test.

Part of the information dealt with the form and

function of the judiciary system.

The F.B.I. and other law enforcement

agencies that were concerned with investigation of spies and
enemy
aliens were described in another instance.

The machinery of politics

in New York state was the subject of a whole series of articles.

Elections and the election process played

a

central role in the

AUFBAU's perspective on the American political system.

The principle

of remaining apolitical was broken, temporarily, in a 1936 report on
the presidential elections entitled "War Clouds Overshadow the Election

Campaign"

(!)

.

In this, and in later reports about upcoming elections,

8

Jan. 35, p.
9

10.

July 5, 40, p.

7;

Nov. 22, 40, p.

5;

June 9, 41, p. 10; Oct. 27

41, p. 21.

^June
^June

9, 44,

p.

10;

5, 42, p. 5;
starts Sep. 42, p. 9.

Oct. 27, 44, p. 21; Apr. 7, 44, p. 3.

"Politics and Politicians in New York

State"
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campaigns were usually seen as
potentially disruptive events at a
time
when continuity and definite leadership
were needed most. The basic

misunderstanding of the function of
elections came out most clearly in
the elections of 1940, a year which
the AUFBAU considered as particularly
12
critical.
Yet the paper never specified what was
so disturbing about
.

.

election campaigns and the confrontations of
candidates and issues.
Because the election process as such looked so
problematic to the
AUFBAU, parties, candidates, and controversial
issues of the campaign

were of secondary importance.

The AUFBAU also shied away from discussing

the role of political parties in elections and as
a basis for governmental

power.

Before the election of 1944 (when

were allowed to vote for the first time

a large

number of refugees

13

the paper made some attempts

)

to explain to its readers the differences between the two major political

parties in two articles on the national conventions of the Republicans
and the Democrats.

The writer of these articles did not offer any

analytical insights in the problems facing the two parties; his description of events was superficial and showed

Democratic view.

a

rather undisguised pro-

14

Conflicts and debates between the parties, as they usually took
place in Congress and other branches of the government, met the decided

12

Jan. 19, 40, p.

8;

Oct. 4, 40, p.

2;

Dec. 14, 40, p. 5.

13

This had to do with the fact that refugee could apply for
citizenship (second papers) only after five years of residence in the
United States. Only by 1944 were a sizable number able to do that; namely,
those who had immigrated during the great rush years of 1938/39.
14

44, p.

July 7, 44, p.
32.

7;

July 28, 44, p.

4;

Oct. 6, 44, p. 42; Nov. 33,
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Disapproval of the AUFBAU
especially during the war.
,

The reason for
this fear of opposition
was usually similar to the
paper's uneasiness
about elections.
In 1942 its advocacy of
"National Unity" concerning all
domestic and foreign issues
went so far as to suggest an
abandonment
of party affiliations for
all legislators for the duration
15
of the war.
With great satisfaction did the
paper register in 1943 that the

traditional blocs in congress (the
farm bloc, the business supporters,
etc.) were disintegrating and
that everyone had started working
together
in the national interest instead
of catering only to one particular

lobbying group.
draw the AUFBAU'

Only the isolationists in Congress continued
to
s

fire;

throughout the war the paper never really
trusted

their disappearance. 17

AUFBAU

's

inadequate portrait of the functioning

of political parties was dominated by
the paper's skewed perspective which
saw different interests and conflicts in
American politics merely as

potential disturbance factors rather than as the basic
principle of

democratic institutions.

A potential third force on the American political landscape, the
trade unions, received similarly unrealistic treatment.
outset, however,
respect:

the

From the

AUFBAU 's attitude appeared to be different in one

labor problems received rather prominent space in the paper,

especially in Siegfrid Aufhauser's "Review of Labor" column which appeared
each week from 1940 until 1944.

15

March

^Oct.
17

6,

42, p.

2, 42, pp.

2;

June 12, 42, p.

2/4.

Jan. 29, 42, p. 4.

Aufhauser's contributions were usually

9;

Oct. 2, 42, p. 2.
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informative and descriptive, rather
than analytical.

And he avoided

taking sides in the major debate
of organised labor In the
pre-„ar years,
the conflict between the AFL
and the
CIO.

In the war years the AUFBAU welcomed
the unified stance of the
.

,

.

rade unions;

18

the increasing cooperation between
unions, government,

and big business;

and such measures as wage ceilings,
price controls,

and anti-strike laws.

The AUFBAU saw the development of comprehensive

governmental war regulations, which made it
impossible for trade unions
to constitute an independent third force
in domestic policies, as a

positive sign that national unity was
In the paper’s view,

a

reality.

20

the presidency and its occupant, Franklin D.

Roosevelt, comprised the most decisive and probably the
only truly

relevant power in the American governmental setup.

Yet the constitutional

and political nature of the office of the President was never
discussed
in any basic form.

Presidential policies meant Roosevelt's policies;

his personality overshadowed the constitutional basis of his power.

Presidential actions were usually judged from the standpoint of
foreign affairs.

And, as Roosevelt was considered to be a firm supporter

of the refugee cause, the AUFBAU'

unconditional.

s

support of everything he did was

Roosevelt's speeches and proclamations in favor of

refugees thus dominated the headlines of the paper;

likewise, his

Apr. 5, 40, p. 8, first article of the "Review of Labor" series;
also Jan 2, 42, p. 14; Aug. 21, 42, p. 8.

^°May 22, 41, p. 24; Jan. 2, 42, p. 14; May 21, 43, p.
p.

43, p.

4.

20

July 23, 43, p.

15;

Sep. 3, 43, p.

18.

3;

Sep.

17,
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attempts to prepare America for
21
entering the war were widely
hailed.
Not only did the paper refrain
from criticising any of
Roosevelt's
actions, but even such failures as
the St. Louis refugee ship
affair of
1939,

the Bermuda Conference on
refugees in 1943, and the ominous

silence of Roosevelt about plans for
postwar Germany were interpreted
22
as positive achievements of the
President.

The focus on Roosevelt's personal
actions soon developed into an

idolization of the President.

He emerged as the national father figure,

especially after elections and on national holidays.

After 1942 the

paper regularly printed birthday messages to
Roosevelt (and he did not

neglect to send the paper

a

greeting on its tenth anniversary). 23

in

an editorial in 1941 Roosevelt was extolled in the
following way:

"Dieses machtige Gesicht ist wie eine Landschaft,
vertraut, anheimelnd, voll eines unverdeckten Lebens,
Gute und naturliche Kraft atmend.
Und wenn man es dann
im Kreise seiner Familiengesichter sieht, so verstarkt
sich der Eindruck, nirgends wird die Harmonie gestort.
Eine klare und gute Ahnenrasse hat hier ihre Fortsetzung
ge f unden.

21

July 5, 40, p.

40, p. 4;
22

Sep.

Jan. 24, 41, p. 8; Feb. 6, 42, p.
7 are early examples.

June 15, 39, pp. 15/16; July

17,

23

1;

Sep. 27, 40, p.

1,

39, p.

5;

Oct.

15,

6;

Sep.

39, p.

13,

10;

43, p. 4.

Dec 22, 44, p. 2.

OA
^Feb. 28, 41, p. 4. "This mighty face is like a landscape, familiar,
homey, full of undisguised life, breathing kindliness and natural power.
And if seen admidst its family faces the impression is confirmed; nowhere
is the harmony disturbed.
A good and clear stock has found its continuation
here." The German text is as awkward as the translation! The editorial
in which Roosevelt was celebrated with such imagery dealt with the significance of the facial expressions of the good and evil leaders of the war.
Hitler's face was seen as incorporating all the elements of a gangstercharacter; a Japanese general's physique was likewise that of a low race
(!) of human beings.
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Eleanor Roosevelt figured
almost as prominently as her
husband in
the headlines of the
AUFBAU
This was probably justified,
as the first
.

lady made refugees one of
her special "pet" concerns.

The AUFBAU
printed her statements on every
relevant issue, especially those
on
anti-alienism and anti-Semitism. 25
In view of the paper's beliefs
concerning the royal functions of

the President, it was not
surprising that major and minor figures
in
the government appeared mostly as
only delegates of Roosevelt.

point could the AUFBAU reader obtain

a

At no

clear view of who actually

comprised Roosevelt's wartime Cabinet and who
were his personal advisers.

Numerous spokesmen of the wartime administration
did appear regularly in
the AUFBAU'

s

pages.

Attorney General Francis Biddle and Vice President

Henry Wallace were often quoted on issues concerning
alien and refugee
policies, as well as on fundamental matters such as
war aims and wartime

economic regulations.

Other Cabinet members, including such important

people as Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of Labor
Frances
Perkins, virtually never appeared in the AUFBAU 's pages.

Here the paper

was reflecting not only its own one-sidedness toward Roosevelt, but the
general trend of a war administration centralized that only the President

himself appeared to speak authoritatively in many matters.

25 Aug.

1,

39, p.

5;

Oct. 3, 41, p.

4;

Nov. 7, 41, p.

2^

1;

Sep.l, 39, p.

1.

°0n wartime bureaucracy and on the legislature, see Richard Polenberg,
War and Society, New York 1972, pp. 193, 194; about the economy, pp. 154 ff.

^
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CHAPTER

IX

AUFBAU AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH
COMMUNITY
Although identification with America's
political order was very
important for the refugees who sought

a new social and political
identity,
1

direct participation in American
politics was restricted to the few

refugees who were citizens.

For many new immigrants, involvement in

the activities of the American Jewish
community offered a helpful

substitute.
tions.

All Jewish refugees could join American
Jewish organiza-

Resettled immigrants who were grateful recipients of
aid

offered by American Jewish communities frequently
identified with and

rediscovered Judaism as a spiritual home.

For many, Judaism probably

became even more important than the emotional bonds they
developed to
the political system of their new homeland.

The AUFBAU reflected this tendency in that it promoted an "aufrechtes
and selbs tewusstes Judentum" (upright and self-confident Jewishness)

,

a characteristic to which it assigned importance equal to the fostering

of a patriotic spirit among its readers.

The paper often contrasted

the relative timelessness and political independence of Judaism with the

time bound course of general politics.

considered to be

a

A Jewish consciousness was

useful means to create cohesiveness among Jews who

had lost their material possessions and their immediate cultural and
social identity due to sudden changes on the political scene. 3

-*-June

2

3

8,

40, p.

3;

Feb. 23, 40, p.

5;

Nov. 40, p. 9.

Dec. 34, p.l.

In articles on High Holidays throughout the paper, and supplement
"die judische Welt" (The Jewish World) starting Oct. 10, 41, every two weeks.

.

,
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In most instances, though,
Jews were pictured as an
integral part

of American society which
had contributed to America's
fame and

importance in the past and continued
to do so in the present.

The

historical commitment of Jews to
America was emphasised in numerous
articles such as "Lincoln und die
Juden" (Lincoln and the Jews)

,

"Theodore Roosevelt und die Juden," and
"Juden in der Kolonialzeit"
(Jews in the colonial age) 4 In other
instances the achievements of
famous contemporary Jews like Bernard Baruch
and Felix Frankfurter were

praised

5

The AUFBAU's discussion of American Jews in the
context of American

history displayed two peculiarities.

For one thing, what the Jewishness

of the famous businessmen and scholars described in the
paper consisted
in was never entirely clear.

Secondly, only the achievements of

individual Jews were celebrated.

The successes of the Jews as an ethnic

group in American society received no emphasis, with the exception of

Jewish participation in wars.
These blind spots were founded in the AUFBAU's and the refugees'

inability to assess the peculiar social and historical situation of

American Jewry.

So diverse were the American Jews' cultural backgrounds

that even they had trouble visualizing themselves as a cohesive group.

For a number of reasons the refugees found themselves in a particularly

complicated situation at the end of the 1930s.

Up to then, two large

waves of Jewish immigrants had come to the United States.

^Feb. 16, 40, p.

2;

^Apr.

11;

19, 40, p.

July 18, 41, p.

7;

Jan.

June 14, 40, p. 13.

German Jews

19, 40, p.ll.
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had immigrated from Southern
and Southwestern Germany
in numbers at the
middle of the 19th century.
Most of them worked their way
up from
humble starting positions as
small shopkeepers and peddlers
in the
United States.

By the end of the century

them had accumulated wealth and
reached
.

.

position.

6

a

considerable proportion of

comfortable middle class

a

German Jews in America established

a

number of charitable

and political organizations, the
most important of which was the American

Jewish Committee, founded in 1906.

7

For

a

long time Jews of German

extraction dominated Jewish social and political
organizations in the
United States.

By the 1930s, however, the other large Jewish
immigrant

group in this country had reached at least equal
political significance
in the American Jewish community.

Immigrants from Poland, Russia, and

other eastern European countries who had come to the United
States in
great numbers around the turn of the century had swiftly formed
their
own organizational bodies, including Jewish labor unions, the American
o

Jewish Congress, and

a

number of Zionist organizations.

Usually the relationships between the two main segments were not
without tensions.

Eastern European Jews were much less westernized in

many ways than their brethren of German extraction; they usually clung
to their old ways of life and their religious beliefs much more

6

Eric Hirshler, Jews From Germany in the United States New York
Stephen Birmingham's " Our Crowd ", New York, 1967, tells
1955, pp. 34-88.
the story of the upper class German Jews in New York City.
,

7

Maurice Karpf, Jewish Community Organization in the United States
New York, 1938, pp. 63ff.; see also Naomi Cohen Not Free to Desist: the
American Jewish Committee 1906-1966 Philadelphia 1972.
,

O

Karpf, pp. 63 ff.

.
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9

rigorously.

Often enough, German-Jewish
entrepreneurs had exploited
eastern European Jews as cheap
laborers when they had first come
to
the United States.

Refugees were caught between the two
groups in

a

special way.

In most respects they resembled
the old German-Jewish immigrants,

especially in their middle class background
and their assimilated
culture.

On the other hand, most refugees were not
too readily accepted

by the status conscious "German American"
Jews but depended mostly on
the help of the largely eastern European
Jewish charities.

The efforts

of these agencies to help the refugees were
often accompanied by

frictions which were rooted in the deeply seated
prejudices of many

German Jews against "Russian" Jews and vice versa.

Refugees from

Germany also had difficulties in accepting the segregated way of
life
and the religious orthodox of many of the Eastern European Jews in
10

America
The AUFBAU avoided open discussion of these differences between

eastern and western Jews, at least in the pre-war years, and only

occasionally indicated that such frictions actually existed.

11

At

times the editors emphasized that a harmonious relationship between the
two groups was possible through articles about personal encounters with

9

Very little direct information on this topic can be found. See
Zosa Szajkowski, "The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees," in
American Jewish. Historical Quarterly Dec. 1971, pp. 103-105, 132/133.
,

Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsche Emigration in den USA, 1933-1945
Dusseldorf, 1971, p. 139.

^March

8,

40, p.

3;

Apr. 1, 39, p.

8;

Apr. 15, 39, p. 5.

,

^
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helpful and understanding
eastern European Jews. 12

In another instance,

when the paper tried to inform
its readers about the
Yiddish press,
the tone of the writing only
highlighted the distance between
the two
communities
.

In the war years the paper
undertook more open discussion of

problems related to the acculturation
of refugees within American Jewry.
The best analysis in this respect
was offered by a refugee. Rabbi Max
Nussbaum, in

speech before the Jewish Club of Los
Angeles in 1943.

a

Nussbaum emphasized that refugees were in
new Jewish immigrants.

a

difficult social position as

They were looked upon with suspicion by both

German Jews and eastern European Jews.

But refugees, Nussbaum concluded,

were themselves partly to blame for the slow pace
of their integration
into American Jewry, because few newcomers made
decided efforts to join

American Jewish organizations.
impression in

a

New York City."

Indirectly the paper confirmed this

series of articles entitled "Jewish Congregations in
The series portrayed only refugee congregations, most

of which counted no Americans among their members.

Some were almost

exactly modeled after specific congregations in Germany."^

Although the paper was able to talk openly about the ethnic

12

May

13

July 25, 41, p. 4.

14

3,

41, p.

12;

Nov. 7, 41, p. 3.

Feb. 5, 43, p. 14; Oct. 22, 43, p. 5.

Series starts Sep. 11, 42, p. 22; see also Alexander Carlebach,
"The German Jewish Immigration and Its Influence on Synagogue Life in
the USA (1933-1942)," in Leo Baeck Yearbook 1964 pp. 351-372.
,
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diversity among Americans by
1943, it could offer no analytical
Insights
into the issues but continued
to urge American Jewish
organizations to
show more cooperation and
solidarity in view of the crisis
of world
Jewry.
This lack of interest in the
historical and sociological
foundations of the differences
within American Jewry was founded
in
the AUFBAU
predominant concern with the fate of
European Jewry at that
time.

The concern with European affairs
was so overwhelming that from

the beginning the AUFBAU had judged
the actions of American Jewish

organizations almost exclusively on the basis
of their efforts to fight

Nazism and anti-Semitism.

In the early years of the paper, when the

most active members were former German Zionists,
American Jewish organizations were most often violently attacked from

a

Zionist standpoint. 16

The activities of American Jewish organizations
were, as a whole, deemed

insufficient, although the AUFBAU supported their boycotts
and mass

meetings.

The early AUFBAU particularly condemned the American Jewish

Committee, which preferred appeals to national and international

political figures and organizations to mass actions.

American Jewish

organizations were accused of forming an upper class establishment that
was alienated from the real needs of suffering Jews.

The paper also

observed, correctly, that the hesitant attitude of some American Jewish

organizations in regard to the refugee problem was rooted in the fear
that too vigorous action in behalf of Jews abroad would endanger the

status of American Jews at home.

1^

1 f)

Apr. 35, pp. 5/6; Apr. 36, pp. 1/2.
1

Feb.

^Apr. 35, pp. 6/7; June 35, p. 5; Sep. 36, p.
2; Szajkowski, pp. 103-112.

37, p.

2;

Oct. 36, p.

1;

8
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The determination with which
the small German-Jewish Club
attacked
the powerful American Jewish
organizations , including the Zionist
groups,
stood in stark contrast to the
negligible influence the Club had within
the American Jewish community.
But, as paper and club became the

representative voices of the newly arriving
refugees of the late thirties,
their attitude towards American Jewish
organizations softened perceptively

And by the beginning of the war the
AUFBAU agreed with most American

organizations that the fate of European Jewry was
being decided mainly
on the battlefields of Europe.

Although events in Palestine continued

to be of great interest in the paper,

its main concern shifted to helping

those Jews who were caught in Europe.

The AUFBAU and the German-Jewish

Club launched a number of charity activities.

Several refugee organiza-

tions like the American Federation of German Jews and the German-

American Congress for Democracy emphasized the special concerns of the
European Jews who had escaped the Nazi onslaught.

1

The nearly complete cutoff of escape routes for refugees after

Pearl Harbor, and especially the knowledge from November 1942 of the

systematic extermination of Jews by the Nazis, increased American Jewry's

concern about the fate of European Jews.

The AUFBAU joined the bulk of

American Jewish organizations in 1942 in calling for immediate and
unified actions by all Jews in America.

Mass rallies, protest strikes,

and nation-wide prayers prompted by the news about the extermination
19

program were seen as manifestations of this emerging solidarity.

^Feb.

2,

^July

17, 41, p.

40, p.

5;

1;

Feb. 28, 41, p. 4;

March

5,

43, p.

1;

July 4, 41, p.

3.

July 16, 43, p. 13.

.
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An important event designed to unite
American Jewry was the

American Jewish Conference, initiated in
early 1943 by the B'nai B'rith.

After

year of preparations and maneuvering, the
conference finally

a

took place in September 1943 in New York
City.

The 501 delegates who

had been elected by Jewish communities and
organizations all over the

country were supposedly representative of all parts of
American Jewry.
Even the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe was
allowed to
send three delegates to the conference, as the AUFBAU recorded
with
.

,

pride

20

American Zionist organizations, however, had arranged to use this
conference as

means of committing American Jewry to an independent

a

Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.
had not espoused this aim.

Until then, many Jewish organizations

But Zionist groups had secured

a

majority

of the delegate seats and, under the pressure of the worldwide political

situation, the Palestine statehood resolutions went through nearly

unanimously.

But, a month later, the American Jewish Committee declared

its open dissent against the outcome of the conference and

a

number of

other Jewish groups that had joined the conference decided to remain
.

,

.

neutral on the issue.

21

The AUFBAU recorded the unfolding of the American Jewish Conference

extensively, but avoided any comment about the Zionist's efforts to use
the convention for their own ends.

Although the results of the confer-

ence brought no help whatever to the persecuted Jews in Europe, the

on

June 18, 43, p.

7;

July 9, 43, p.

1.

21

Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism
1961, ch. 9 passim.

,

Detroit

.
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AUFBAU had its own reasons for thinking that the
meeting had been
valuable.

For one thing, the paper believed that such

a

conference

had finally achieved at least a temporary unity of
action among American
Jews.

This was considered to be

further actions.

a

vital basis upon which to build any

In addition, the unity of American Jews would also

facilitate the participation and acceptance of refugees in American

Jewish organizations.

22

Consequently, the AUFBAU joined in the wide-

spread condemnation of the American Jewish Committee's dissent from
the results of the conference.

23

It was only too evident, though, that the conference and most other

actions of American Jewish organizations had brought no change in the

situation of European Jews.

The AUFBAU expressed its frustration about

this fact only in a very subdued way.

For the most part, through 1944,
24

it simply avoided the extermination issue.

The paper continued to

declare that the most effective way for the refugees to fight the Nazis
was through active participation in the war on the side of the Allies.

25

To be sure, though, the concentration on problems of foreign policy
did not solve the everyday problems of refugees who had to find some way

of accommodating themselves within the different groups and sections of

American Jewry.

This issue remained particularly crucial for those

22

May 15, 42,

23 0ct.
24
25

Nov

29

,
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p.

»

3;

p.

5, 43, P-

1;

i-H

July 23, 43, p.

1;

Nov. 5, 43, p. 4.

CM

Nov. 5, 43, P- 15; Jan. 14, 44, p

.

1.

Sep. 3, 43, p.

1;

Sep.

10, 43, p
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refugees who had no explicit religious or political
affiliations to

American Jewry.
look for help?

To what ethnic group in American society could they

.
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CHAPTER

X

GERMAN AMERICANS AND THE REFUGEES

Non- Jewish German Americans, with their tightly knit Vereinsleben
(club life) and their family and food centered culture, seemingly

offered much of what the German refugees were missing in the United
States.

Indeed, German Americans and German Jewish refugees had many

interests in common; both formed a wide variety of clubs where they
fulfilled their love for music and discussed cultural and political
topics.

Sports activities also were important in the life of both

communities
Yet association between the old and the new immigrants from

Germany was rare, and hostile feelings, especially on the side of the
refugees towards the German Americans, seem to have prevailed.

The

tensions very likely originated in the different circumstances under

which German-Americans and German Jewish refugees had come to the
United States.

While most of the older German American immigrants had

left Germany for economic reasons and still identified with German

culture, refugees were more ambiguous about their German past because
of their experiences under the Nazis.

The closeness of German American

ethnic culture to some of the things the refugees wanted to leave behind

increased their reservations toward German ethnic groups in this country.
The AUFBAU expressed these feelings rather clearly.

Though refugees

New York
had contacts with German Americans in many ways, especially in
or old fashioned,
City, they generally denounced German Americans as Nazis

unpolitical wurst eaters and Kaiser admirers.

The AUFBAU was never

of German immigrants.
entirely able to overcome such stereotyped views
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German immigration to the United States began around
1800.

Before

the Civil War, most of these settlers, who were mainly
farmers and

craftsmen, struck roots in Pennsylvania and Ohio. 1

The first wave of

political immigrants, actually the earliest group of German refugees,
came in the wake of the 1848 revolution in Germany.

Among those who

immigrated to the United States to escape political persecution were

many well known radicals of the 48 movement. 2

A third large group of German immigrants followed in the 1870s and
Most of these newcomers were industrial or agricultural workers;

1880s.

some were socialists and labor organizers who fled the country during

Bismarck's suppression of the socialist party in Germany.

3

The 48ers

as well as the later immigrants quickly developed into a well organized

ethnic group.

The extensive German language press and the numerous

Gesangs-and and Turnvereine (glee clubs and gymnastic societies) brought
German Americans together in their leisure time and kept alive the
ideas of German liberalism and socialism.

By the beginning of the 20th century, when immigration from Germany
had levelled off, German Americans, by then most heavily settled in the

Midwest

1

were one of the most vocal and best organized ethnic groups

Carl Wittke, We Who Built America

,

Cleveland, 1967,

p.

188.

^Ibid., pp. 189-195.
^Ibid., pp. 238-241.
to
^Wolfgang Kollermann and Peter Marschalck, "German Emigration
Harvard
History
the United States," in: Perspectives in American
University Press, Fall 1973, pp. 544, 546.
,
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in the United States.

Although most of their organizations had by

then lost their political flavor and were purely social
clubs,'*

German Americans tended to act in
concerned.

a

unified way where politics were

They voted strongly against prohibition candidates, the

prohibition laws, and women's suffrage (because of its connection with
prohibition)
in the 1914

,

and they supported Wilson and his isolationist policies
£

and 1916 elections.

But World War

I

saw an unprecedented outbreak of anti-German feeling

in the United States which manifested itself in open attacks on German

Americans, judicial persecution of many who were supposedly disloyal,
and a ban on everything associated with German culture.

The German

American community had openly favored the German cause at the beginning
of the war, but it remained loyal to the United States after American

entry into the war.

Nevertheless, the German Americans and their

organized life as an ethnic community never really recovered from the
fears and suppressions of World War I.
The 1920s saw yet another wave of German immigrants trying their

luck in the New World.

This time it was an economic and only indirectly

politically influenced movement of almost half

a

million Germans.

Most of them were craftsmen, skilled industrial workers, or farm laborers

^Wittke, pp. 212-217.

York 1973,
^Harold Furer, The Germans in America Dobbs Ferry, New
Populists Chicago 1963, pp. 71/72.
p. 71; Walter Nugent, The Tolerant
,

,

^Marschalck/Kollermann, p. 546; Furer, p. 74.
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who had left

a

troubled Germany.

g

Their discontent with political and

economic conditions in postwar Germany may have been related to their

generally more conservative attitudes.

These new German Americans did

not have any significant impact on the surviving German American

organizations.

The only new German American organization of any

importance that emerged in the twenties was the Steuben Society,
founded in 1919.

Under its leader, New York school commissioner

Theodore Huebener, it wanted to revive interest in German high culture
q

and the German liberal tradition.

The only organizations in which the recent German immigrants played
a

notable role were

a

number of German American fascist groups which

sprang up in the 1930s; particularly The Friends of the New Germany and
the Amerikadeutscher Volksbund (German-American Bund)

propagandized for the Third Reich, portraying it as

a

.

These groups

rebirth of

Germany's glorious cultural tradition and political power.

The most

notorious of them was undoubtedly the German-American Bund, founded in
1936 and led by Fritz Kuhn.

At its high point, the Bund probably had

25,000 members (most of them in the New York City area).

The Bund

claimed, and the public believed, that the National Socialists in

Germany supported it as

a

sister organization and regarded it as the

spearhead of the National Socialist revolution in the United States.
storm
The German government, however, considered Kuhn's imitation
of detente
troopers merely an embarassment which threatened its policy

8

Marschalck/Kollermann,

^Furer, p. 75.

p.

546.
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towards the United States.

It supported the Bund only hesitantly in

its early years with some propaganda material.

all connections to Kuhn were cut off.

And in the late thirties

The Bund eventually dissolved

when Kuhn was jailed in 1940; its political position had become

virtually untenable after the war had started.
Even though the Bund never counted

a

large number of the German

Americans among its followers, the American public as well as the AUFBAU
believed some of the propaganda of this organization.

They suspected

that a systematic subversion of the United States by the National Socialists was underway and that the Bund and similar establishments were the

harbingers of this movement.
suspicions that Germany had

These fears were intensified after 1939 by
a

complex and sophisticated network of

agents and spies operating in the United States in order to prepare the
11

country for

a

Nazi takeover.

Postwar historical research on the subject has proved that an

organized fifth column did not exist in the form suspected by American
12

public opinion.

All in all, the propaganda attempts of the Nazis in

the United States were restricted to the dissemination of literature.

These efforts involved such official agencies as the German consulate

10

Sander F. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States
New York 1974, p, 222.

,

Ithaca,

on the 5th column appears in the AUFBAU series "The
John
5th Column in California," throughout 1942/1943, and in Oetje
Rogge, The Official German Report New York 1961.
''''''Information

,

1

0

a myth by
The 5th column was first shown to have been largely
World War, New York
Louis DeJong, The German 5th Column in the Seco nd
1956.

^
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in New York City and the German railroad information
bureau.

The

activities of these organizations were coordinated by World
War

I

propaganda veteran George Sylvester Viereck and German diplomatic
officials.

13

At times, Viereck and his co-workers even managed to

contact some isolationist congressmen.

Whether their efforts left any

impact on these politicians or the rest of the American public is not

known

.

For the first five years of its existence, AUFBAU consistently

depicted German Americans as fascists, Nazis, or Jew haters.
only

a

Although

small number of German Americans were active supporters of

Hitler or any fascist movements at all, the AUFBAU felt threatened by
every sneeze from right wing German Americans.

The AUFBAU'

unsubstantiated though they look today, did constitute
of a distortion in the AUFBAU'

s

a

s

apprehensions,

prime example

perspective on American society,

a

distortion caused by the exigencies of the refugees in this country.
One of the main attacks of the AUFBAU against German Americans was

directed at the New Yorker Staatszeitung
dating back to 1834.

,

a

German language newspaper

In the 1930s the Staatszeitung was the largest

German language publication in the country, and one of only twelve

remaining German dailies.

^

It had the reputation of being restrained

in den Vereinigten Staaten
conclusion,
pp. 207-212.
Heidelberg 1971, especially

^Klaus Kipphan, Deutsch Propaganda
1933-1941

,

M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck, German -American
Propagandist , Urbana, Illinois 1972, ch. VII.

^Niel

Wittke, The German Language Press in America
Kentucky Press 1957, p. 282.
•*-^Carl

,

University of

6

.

Ill

in its general opinions and political views.

The AUFBAU, however,

constantly attacked the paper for its alleged anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi
attitudes

1

The AUFBAU 's examples of the Staatszeitung

.

anti-Semitism at most show the Staatszeitung

1

s

1

s

supposed

hesitant and ambivalent

attitude towards Hitler's Germany and the refugees in the United States.
For the AUFBAU, this was enough to show that the

itself to Nazi propaganda.

Staatszeitung lent

Although the AUFBAU continuously warned

its readers not to touch the

Staatszeitung

,

it was read by refugees and

subscribed to by refugee organizations.^
The same attitudes of the AUFBAU prevailed towards most people and

businesses in Yorkville, the most heavily German American section of
Yorkville, the paper contended, was infested with Nazi

Manhattan.
activities.

18

Not only did its German inhabitants openly express their

sympathies for the Nazi cause, but German Americans there were also

systematically used by Nazi agents in the United States for their
In the impending Nazi takeover which the AUFBAU

destructive ends.

feared in the thirties, German Americans, with the help of the fatherland,

would play the dominant role.

16

pp.

AU Sep. 35, pp. 8/9; Dec. 35, pp. 5/6; Apr. 36,
Dec. 22, 39, p. 20; Apr. 19, 40, p.

1/2;
17

Native American fascism was only seen as

July

3,

^ Refugees

42, p.

2;

p.

1;

June 37,

June, 14, 40, p. 4.

5.

Work by Sophia Robison et al. (see Chapter 5, p. )
refugees who
found that Yorkville was one of the favorite locations for
Of all parts of Manhattan, only the
set up businesses of their own.
Yorkville (70)
upper West side had more (96) refugee businesses than
40
Ibid
p
at

,

.

.

,

19

.

May 17, 40,

p.

2;

Dec. 27, 40, p. 4;

Jan 23, 41,

p.

4.

^
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a

minute force in this context.
These attitudes closely resembled the anti-German attitudes in

the United States during World War I.

Interestingly enough, the AUFBAU

modified its stand towards German Americans when anti-German feelings
in general became more manifest in the United States.

With the

outbreak of World War II, refugees became aware of the fact that they
too were considered Germans and consequently were classified as "enemy

aliens" by the government and by

a

suspicious public.

Clearly,

witch

a

hunt for German Americans was not in the interest of any group of

German immigrants

.

During the war, then, the AUFBAU printed articles that depicted

German Americans as

loyal but largely unpolitical group.

a

22

German

Americans were not too dangerous anymore, but even their non-political
attitude drew critical and patronizing remarks from the AUFBAU.

The

paper reckoned that German Americans, in their isolated existence as

a

separate ethnic group, had lost touch with German as well as with

American political realities.
sometime before World War I.

Time had stood still for them since

This idea of the provincial, politically

retarded, petit bourgeois German American was not

a

flattering portrait.

But it seems to have been partly true, even though the basis of this

provincialism was more complex than the AUFBAU suspected.

The paper did

anti-German hysteria of World War
not recognize, for example, that the

Stember
200n anti-German feeling in the United States see Charles
9.
1
America New York 1968, p.
et al. Jews in the Mind of
,

to suspect
the paper warned its readers
or sounding person.
spy in every foreign looking
21

Sep

.

22 Nov.

11, 42,

1,

p.

41, p.

40;

9;

Jan.

30, 42, p.

2.

a

I

s
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was reason enough for many German Americans to avoid
any political

involvement as an ethnic group.
But there were German Americans of whom the AUFBAU was very proud,

because they had attained important positions in American politics in
the 1930 's.

People like Wendell Willkie and Robert

F.

Wagner were

hailed and portrayed in much the same manner as famous American Jews.
These prominent German Americans deserved admiration not only for
their power and their capabilities as public figures, but also because
they had succeeded in shedding their ethnicity and had become successful

Americans.

23

In other words, for the AUFBAU the best German American

was the one who could no longer be identified as

a

German American.

Only at one point, for the AUFBAU, did identification with one's

national origin become important, even necessary, for German Americans;
that was in the fight against fascism and Nazism.

view, German Americans, just like Jews, had

a

In the AUFBAU'

special stake in fighting

against Hitler and for the preservation of democracy.

But up to the late

war years, the paper contended that German Americans largely failed to
rise to that responsibility.

Few Germap. Americans, other than recent

immigrants, had joined anti-fascist organizations in the United States.

Of all German American groups, the AUFBAU maintained connections only

with old time German socialist movements.

23

24

Dec

.

15,

39, p.

Nov. 1, 41, p.

1;

8;

And even those groups were

Jan. 30, 42, p. 5.

Jan. 30, 42, p. 5.

.
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by then largely dominated by recent immigrants.

German Americans might have read the AUFBAU
at one point,

26

and

number of them might have joined the small,

a

s

s

But actually nothing

idea that German Americans should fight together

in the front ranks against fascism.

The AUFBAU'

Some liberal minded

the paper freely admitted

,

anti-Nazi Loyal Americans of German Descent. 27
came of the AUFBAU'

0c

28

views on German Americans show

a

contradictory position

toward an ethnic group which was very similar to the refugees.

On the

one hand, German Americans were criticized for their lack of assimilation
and their clanishness;

on the other hand, they were scolded when they

were not able to show the cohesiveness of an ethnic group in the fight
This split consciousness reflected the situation of

against fascism.

the refugees themselves in many respects.
a

After all, most refugees had

cultural heritage similar to that of the German Americans.

They spoke

the same language and showed the same love for literature and music.

How

29

much of this could they sacrifice for the sake of Americanization?

Had

America enough to offer to make up for this loss?

25

Gerhard Seger, editor of the social democratic weekly Neue
41,
Volkszeitung sometimes wrote articles for the AUFBAU (e.g., Nov. 1,
some
and
AUFBAU,
the
in
p. 9), his paper was advertised frequently
regularly
members of the social democratic exile wrote for the AUFBAU
(Weichmann and Aufhauser)
,

^June
2

2

^Aug.

14, 41, p. 4.
1,

41, p.

5;

Dec.

11, 42, p. 4;

Jan.

11, 43, p. 4.

^Kipphan, pp. 195-199.

language.
^Concerning the preservation of German culture and

March 27, 42,

p.

32;

Apr. 11, 41, p.

7;

Apr. 18, 41, p. 7.
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CHAPTER

XI

AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE AUFBAU- -PROPAGANDA OR ART?

Although the AUFBAU was published through the 1930s, it provided
no real coverage of American cultural life until early 1939.

And only

at the end of that year did regular features on art and literature

appear in the paper.

1

Consequently, the AUFBAU

American culture emerged in the war years,
development.

a

's

assessments of

time of relatively stagnant

Despite this limitation, the AUFBAU'

s

treatment of

popular and high culture does offer valuable insight into the refugees'
perspective on America's cultural life.
The earliest regular arts features in the AUFBAU dealt with movies
and how and where they were made.

Throughout the war years, extensive

articles about films continued as

a

regular feature of the paper.

By

1940 the AUFBAU printed a bi-monthly column of news from Hollywood

("Hollywood Calling..") and two to four movie reviews each week.

The

critiques and columns were usually written by such competent authors
as Hans Kafka and Ernst Lubitsch.

2

Many reports in the AUFBAU explained

how the Hollywood dream factories functioned; sometimes the paper
discussed the social lives of actors and producers as well as the
artistic and political aspects of moviemaking.

X

Apr

.

15,

39, p.

2;

May

1,

39, p.

16;

3

May 15, 39,

p.

14.

40ff.
^Emigre film experts are discussed by Kafka, Dec. 22, 44, pp.

p.

4;

^May
Nov.

position); July 1,
39, p. 16 (Hollywood's political
May 29, 42, p. 17.
1, 39, p. 15; June 6, 41, p. 15;

1,

39,

^
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Theatre events were reported from early in the paper's
existence.
But, for the most part, the AUFBAU

s

'

interests of the refugee community.

theatre news focused on the special4

Reports told of

a

refugee actor

or actress starting a new career on Broadway, the WPA theatre staging
a

German language play, the initial presentation in English translation

of a refugee writer's play, or a Yiddish drama on the fate of refugees.

Of all stage events, only Yiddish theatre and musicals received regular
coverage.

Other plays were only irregularly reviewed, and those dis-

cussed usually did not reveal a representative picture of the American
theatre

.

Musicals

.

Much the same selectivity occurred in regard to musicals.

This child of the European operette had grown mostly in American

cultural soil.

The 1930s had been a fruitful time for musical comedies,

and by the end of that decade the musical had won a prominent place on

Yet the AUFBAU never really paid much attention

the American stage.

to the popular American musical.

reviewed extensively.

Only Yiddish productions were

The few German light operas tried on this side

of the Atlantic, though, were much celebrated by the paper.

Classical Music

.

The same dominant concern with the more European

forms of the arts showed in the AUFBAU'

4

Dec.

11, 42, p.

^May 36, p.

5;

11;

15,

June 5, 42, p.

^Nov. 14, 41, p. 11;
7

Dec.

June 14, 43, p.

9;

39,
4;

s

p.

coverage of classical music.

9.

Nov. 5, 42, p. 11; Oct. 15,

Sep. 4, 42, p.

10.

Nov. 6, 42, p. 10.

4_>,

p.

12
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By the end of 1939 frequent reviews of concerts and operas began
to
appear, and soon the paper had

regularly filled

a

a

musical editor (Arthur Holde) who

page with reviews and articles about musical events.

As many European musicians were performing mainly in the United
States by 1940,

8

the AUFBAU's music pages read almost like those in any

German paper before 1933.

Indeed, the great number of European artists

provided such excellent performances of classical and contemporary

music (including opera) that the sparse American musical life led only
negligible existence, hardly noticed by the AUFBAU

a

Only black

.

American performers of European classical music appeared worthy of
9

notice for the paper.

American popular music (including jazz)

received practically no recognition.
a

All in all, the AUFBAU published

music page that catered to the tastes of middle class refugees from

Germany and Austria.

New York's role as the provisional world capital

of the arts during World War II made it possible for the AUFBAU to

preserve the central European perspective of its readers.
Literature.

Literary pages which did not become a regular

feature of the AUFBAU until 1940, retained an uneven quality throughout
the war years.

American literature was discussed only in summary

articles that dealt with one literary epoch or style--rarely more than
10

100 lines at a time.

Reviews of American books were extremely rare,

11
^This topic is surveyed in Dec. 22, 44, pp. 49ff.; June 26, 42, p.

^Charles Alexander, Nationalism in American Life

,

Chicago 1969, p. 209.

Amerikanischer
0ct. 2, 42, p. 8, first article of "Gestalten
also Oct. 1,
Literatur," it continues irregularly throughout 1943/44;
10

39, p.

6.

.

^
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and background information about literary trends and the
reading public

did not appear at all until 1944. 11
The paper

discussion of German literature more than conpensated

s

for its negligence concerning American writing.

As the AUFBAU became

more and more the voice of the intellectual immigration, it commenced
to serve as a forum for emigre^ writers, poets, and journalists.

The

literary scene of the German exile was reflected not only in book
reviews, portraits, and news about writers; but much original emigre

writing first appeared in the AUFBAU.

Thus the literature pages, along

with the music pages, were among the best features of the AUFBAU,
features upon which much of its enduring fame as an exile paper was
founded.
The AUFBAU'

s

curious neglect of American literature very likely

had its origin in the new immigrants' limited access to the English
language.

Language problems always posed problems to the refugees in
Furthermore, many Europeans looked on American writing

everyday life.

as of secondary importance.

Journalism

.

The paper knew very well that American culture

consisted of more than Hollywood movies.

Yet, instead of studying

American literature or music, it recommended that refugees become
acquainted with the more typical products of American popular culture.
They should read comic strips and the syndicated columns, and listen

Public in
^''"Bucher und Leser in Amerika" (Books and the Reading
America) starts in the Summer of 1944.
'^A survey of this topic is in Dec. 22, 44, p. 47;
Aug 7, 42, p. 1/5.

Dec 29, 44, pp. 2/3
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to the popular radio shows, and thus get to know
the cultural elements

that were part of every American's life.

For the AUFBAU

,

American

journalism and radio entertainment were important not only because of
their didactic function for the newcomer, but also because their formal

perfection made them equal to traditional kinds of art.

Discussion

about comic strips, and highly enthusiastic comments about columnists
and radio entertainers, made clear to the European reader that in the

New World journalism was

a

highly sophisticated expression of social

and cultural life, even though it appealed not to an intellectual elite

but to a mass audience.
was

Despite the fact that in European terms this

negative characteristic, for the AUFBAU these types of mass

a

culture provided most useful instruments for Americanization of the
refugee.

13

Meanwhile, the more traditional forms of the arts,

classical music, and literature remained in the non- judgmental area of
l'art pour l'art

.

But what kind of values should American culture teach the new
immigrant?

A close analysis shows that the most frequently used terms

that supposedly expressed American virtues for the AUFBAU coincided

with the vocabulary of American war propaganda: Freedom and Democracy,
the preservation of individual liberties, and the voluntary solidarity

Of particular importance for

of a nation preserving these traditions.

allowed
the immigrant was the emphasis on an egalitarian society which

participate
everybody, regardless of his background, race, or creed, to

13 Feb
p.

7;

28, 40,
July 11, 40.

p.

9;

p.

24.

Oct 18, 40, p.

3;

Apr 15, 39,

p.

2;

July 4, 40,
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in this comprehensive effort.

The worth of most American literary and artistic products was

measured by how well they seemed to disseminate these American virtues.
The paper's treatment of American literature offers
this ideological viewpoint.

a

prime example of

"Gestalten Amerikanischer Literatur,"

a

regular feature throughout 1943 and 1944, reviewed the American literary
scene from Thomas Paine to John Steinbeck, William Saroyan, and John Dos
14

Passos.

The writer of this series revealed

understanding of American literature.

a

rather one -dimensional

Writers of the 19th century were

judged mainly on the strength of their social commitments as expressed

through their books.

Thus Harriet Beecher Stowe, though generally

considered naive, was highly praised for her abolitionist stand; but
James Fenimore Cooper's pioneer stories were discredited because they

celebrated Rousseau's ideal of the innocent individual who defies
collective action.

15

Likewise, the popular contemporary writers Thomas

Wolfe, William Faulkner, and William Saroyan, were disqualified as

individualistic romantics.

Steinbeck, Dos Passos, and especially

Hemingway, on the other hand, were celebrated for their humanistic
and masculine (!) portraits of American society.

Many of the AUFBAU's film reviews followed much the same course.
The most American movie, one e/ery immigrant ought to see, was The

Grapes of Wrath

.

Early film critiques supported the notion that Hollywood

should not simply be

14

a

dream factory, but should also offer an outlet

Dec 10, 43, p. 15; Dec 24, 43, p. 15.

^March

19, 43, p.

10;

Oct.

16, 42, p.

7.
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for social criticism in its films. 16

But as the war approached,

movies became less perceptive of social reality and conflict, and
most
of them either retreated into individual romance or proclaimed

patriotism.
critical.

blunt

a

In parallel fashion, AUFBAU film reviews became less

Most extensively reviewed were war movies.

Considering the

usual low quality of these Hollywood products, the paper's criticism
was sparse and without perspective.

would take issue with

a

Occasionally, the film critic

too mellow portrait of the Nazis or the glamorous

view of the war in general.

^

The melodramatic accounts of solidarity

and the glorification of group life were what made these movies so

valuable to the AUFBAU.

These pictures, it was thought, would give

the spectator on the homefront a clearer view of what the nation was

fighting for and how well it did its job.

In line with most of the

American public, the paper maintained that Hollywood did its best to
convey wartime reality to the masses.

Entertainment movies were usually

judged much more severely by the AUFBAU, and the reviews had

a

tendency

to condemn lightweight features as unrealistic in time of an international
18

crisis.

A number of background reports analyzed and approved the influence
of Hollywood in mobilizing the public spirit for the war effort.

The

difference between the cooperation of Hollywood's moviemakers and the
centralized propaganda machines of the fascist powers was seen to lie

16

jan 24, 41, p. 11; May

2,

41, p. 9; Nov.

17

Feb 12, 43, p.

18

July 24, 42, p. 22; March 26, 43, p. 11.

9;

Dec 3, 43, p. 12;

14, 42, p.

9;

Jan 14, 44, p. 21.

March 26, 43,

p.

1-
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mainly in the voluntary nature of Hollywood's contribution
as well as
in the inherently good aims for which the Allies
were fighting.

What

these aims were, precisely, is not found in either the movies
or the
reviews.

19

Not only the concerted yet voluntary effort of the

media and the arts, but also the diversity of artistic expression
impressed the AUFBAU

Unlike oppressed Europe, America prescribed no

.

mold into which all forms of art had to fit.

Throughout the country,

but especially in metropolitan New York, many ethnic groups had been able
to retain their special form of artistic expression.

The AUFBAU's

interest in New York's ethnically diverse cultural scene shows clearly
in articles about Chinese theatre, Indian art, and Negro music.

20

Most prominent among the different ethnic arts were Yiddish theatre
and musical comedy.

The AUFBAU reviewed almost every Yiddish stage

event in town and published numerous portraits of the stars of the

Yiddish stage.

21

This is surprising since German Jews were traditionally

unfamiliar with this form of folkloristic art preserved by Eastern

European Jews.
Yiddish.

The majority of the refugees did not even understand

Probably the AUFBAU editors had reason to believe that

Yiddish theatre was nevertheless attractive to German speaking refugees
because this was the closest thing to German language theater that was

and Arthur McClure, Hollywood at War New York 1973,
could
pp. 15-24, esp. p. 22, confirms this impression, one that one
reviews.
also gather from the AUFBAU's film

^Ken Jones

20

42, p.
21

July 26, 40,

,

p.

3;

Sep. 27, 40, p.

3;

Feb 27, 41, p. 10;

Sep 4,

10.

Sep 4, 42, p. 12; Jan 15, 43, p. 12; Jan 22, 43, p.
43, p. 16; Nov 19, 43, p. 13.

12;

Oct

1,

.
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available

22

When the AUFBAU looked beyond the melting pot situation of the
urban centers, it saw most forms of the popular arts as mass fabricated
products.

This was considered to be an inherently positive character-

istic of the popular arts in America.

A mass audience for such

products as movies, radio shows, syndicated newspaper columns, and
comic strips could serve a massive educational effort.

Moreover, the

infinite reproductibility of popular culture also meant infinite

accesibility of cultural values and expressions to everybody, including
the refugees.

The egalitarianism of popular culture was therefore

seen as a value built into the American democratic system which made

solidarity, heightened public consciousness, and maturity possible for

everybody, immigrant and native American alike.

During the war years the uniformity of cultural products increased.

Lack of critical consciousness became clearly noticeable in the AUFBAU,
as in the American press generally.

But, unlike the American press,

the AUFBAU kept a special refugee where the immigrants' critical and

speculative minds could survive.

European art, far away, yet utterly

familiar, continued to be the subject of subtle reflection and heated

discussion on the paper's pages.

Here values and forms of the arts could

be criticized and questioned openly.

These debates were meaningful to

and
their readers because the relationships they had to music, theatre,

literature still defined much of their middle class consciousness.

22

Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsche Emigration in den USA

1972, p.

137.

,

Dusseldorf
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Their exile situation and the small audiences
many emigre artists
had did provide some positive effects.

Artists and intellectuals enjoyed

liberties and experienced new influences they could
not have had in
the Europe of the 1930s.

Yet they also missed the massive acclamation

of the European middle class.

The comparatively small audience of

refugees, on the other hand, was privileged by this situation.

They

could participate in most cultural events of the exile as their paper,
the AUFBAU, successfully played the role of active mediator of the free

European arts.

The paper thus offered a special means of survival in

an inherently alien, mass produced cultural forest of Hollywood movies

and syndicated columns.

For the refugees it provided

a

buffer to the

harshest forms of the cultural shock.
The culture pages of the AUFBAU, though not so different in

appearance from those of the New York Times

,

had

a

very special function.

In no way did they ever wish to reflect the American cultural scene as

observed by American contemporaries or historians.

To the AUFBAU, art

in America was only noteworthy if it fulfilled its primary task of

Americanizing the refugee.

Accordingly, .many parts of the American

cultural scene were overlooked because they were not useful for this
purpose.

American literature, theatre, and popular music, as well as

such pursuits as architecture and dance, did not appear.

In the more

European "Kultur" part of the paper the refugee could foster his love
for largely non-didactic and complex forms of cultural life.

s
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CHAPTER

XII

AUFBAU FIGHTS THE WAR

After 1939, not only the cultural pages, but most features of
the AUFBAU were overshadowed by the events of the war.

For the German

refugees the Second World War began with Hitler's invasion of Poland.

An existential fear for the survival of the free world shaped the
refugees' perspective on foreign and domestic news long before official

American involvement in the war.
This anxiety also lay behind the paper's strong internationalist
and interventionist position in foreign affairs.

The official neutrality

of the United States between 1939 and 1941 was only

much meaning for the AUFBAU.

a

label without

Throughout the pre-war years the editors

professed their approval of what they considered to be Roosevelt's
open support of the Allied powers.

In the elections of 1940 the President

was hailed as the saviour of the free world, while the activities of
the isolationist politicians were condemned as subversive.

Their

"America First" policies were only disguised support for the Axis, the
1

AUFBAU proclaimed.
The paper observed with great satisfaction the government's early

attempts to reorganize the American economy for the production of war

materials.

Frequent reports on the Lend Lease Bill and the increasing

production of war material tor the Allies underscored the AUFBAU'
approval of the United States support of the Western powers.

The

resulting improvement in the American economic situation received only

1

Feb. 2, 40, p. 4; Dec. 2, 40, pp. 1/2.
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secondary emphasis in the paper. 2
As early as 1940 the AUFBAU began to take part in
building up

strong homefront commitment against Hitler.

a

Refugees were advised to

register for defense work, or, if possible to enlist in the army.

Civilian defense preparations also became

before Pearl Harbor.

a

focus of attention well

(Unlike the army, civilian defense did allow

foreigners to participate.)

This was considered to be

a

particularly

useful activity for refugees who wanted to prove their willingness to
fight the fascist threat.^
So AUFBAU readers were well prepared when the Japanese attack on

Pearl Harbor brought the United States fully into the war.

The AUFBAU 's

coverage of war events increased in amount and in quality, but no change
of opinion occurred on any fundamental question.

The paper remained

predominately concerned with events on the Atlantic front, but the
situation on the homefront received rather accurate and extensive

attention during the war.

But the influence the war showed on American

domestic affairs was seen not so much from

a

political perspective as

from the viewpoint of the worker, the consumer, the soldier, and the

urban dweller.
The AUFBAU did not provide coverage of the basic functioning of the

war administration agencies,

a fact

which made it particularly difficult

to get a coherent picture of the changed inteplay between legislature

^ay
Sep.

17, 40, pp. 1/2; May 24, 40, pp.
27, 40, p. 2; Jan. 17, 41, p. 1, Jan.

^Apr. 25, 41, pp. 1&3.

1&3; July 5, 40, p. 4;
31, 41, p. 1; Apr. 18, 41, p. 2.

.
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and executive during the war.

The paper had never held Congress in

particular esteem anyway, but its struggles with burgeoning
Roosevelt

administration were even more unclear after 1939 than in the previous
years.

And, although the government's measures in regard to military

priorities for war production became more and more noticeable to the
average citizen, the AUFBAU did not print sufficient information about
even the major war agencies.

The war administration appeared as

a

hydra-headed monster that talked in many tongues and took many shapes.
The AUFBAU therefore relied mainly on messages from President Roosevelt

himself and some of his major cabinet members to distinguish political
tendencies from administrative detail.
Just as in the pre-war years, then, the dominating forces of the

government were represented by President Roosevelt and those Cabinet

members who functioned as his personal aides.

The AUFBAU 's nearly

absolute belief in the inherent righteousness of all presidential

decisions made most measures of the war administration immune to

criticism for the paper (except for the government's inclusion of
refugees in the "enemy alien" category)

.

But basic questions of world

politics did start lively discussions in the paper about such things as
the position of refugees and aliens in the United States, Roosevelt

s

war strategy, and the policies of the American government toward postwar
4
„
Europe

The AUFBAU approved participation of political parties, unions,

March 31, 44, p. 2. For a discussion of wartime
York 19 / 2 pp. 193,194
bureaucracy, see Richard Polenger, War and Society, New
4

Sep.

17, 43, p.

e;

,

.
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and other interest groups in the decisionmaking
process of the war

government, if it took place without dissent from general administrative
policies.

All forces which could potentially oppose the government

were seen as disturbing elements.

The AUFBAU

'

s

fears of internal disruption

by these rivals of governmental power definitely surpassed those of

most Americans.

This fact was partly due to the higher tension under

which the refugees lived during the war.
a

But it also points toward

basic insecurity that had its roots in the experiences of the Weimar

Republic
Less narrowed by fears and ideological blindness than the paper's

perspectives on domestic politics was its reporting about the war

economy and wartime society, especially as they reflected the refugees'

everyday life.

Three topics that had a major impact on changing the

economic and social structure of the country held primary interest for
the AUFBAU and its readers:

(1)

the shortage of labor,

of raw materials and goods for civilian production,
the resulting inflation.

(2)

(3)

the shortage

rising wages and

The paper dwelt on all these factors and their

interconnections at great length, along with their probable effects on
the postwar economy.

The change in the workingman's position during the war was

a

development that affected the lives and perspectives of the refugees
most decisively.

"Enemy aliens" had constituted

a

class of workers

that was strongly discriminated against until late 1942.

But by that

in
time even older, untrained refugees no longer had difficulties

finding jobs outside New York City.

The AUFBAU, however, urged its

any kind of job,
readers not to respond to the new situation by taking
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but to look specifically for work in the defense industry.

Yet many

war plants, in accordance with restrictive legislation, refused to hire
"enemy aliens" for fear that spies might be among them.

Throughout

the war, the paper continually criticized this situation.'*

But even when

refugee did join the ranks of the well paid

a

defense workers he faced new kinds of hardships.

He was joining

huge migration of Americans, most of them formerly unemployed.

a

These

newly recruited workers flocked into the boom towns throughout the
country where hastily erected temporary housing and often hostile townspeople awaited them.

These circumstances, as well as the prospect of

being unemployed after the war boom was over, did not offer the refugees
the stability which they greatly needed.

For the most part, the AUFBAU

failed to mention these more somber aspects of work in defense industry,

but instead stressed the emotionally rewarding quality of such work.
The paper argued that in times of national emergency sacrifices were

necessary in order to maintain
Inflation was

a

a

high standard of war production.

6

problem that mainly hit those refugees who worked

in the lower paid white collar jobs.

The paper reassured its readers

that the government was doing everything possible to curb inflation.

Wage ceilings in labor contracts, price freezes imposed by the war
administration on most consumer goods, and rationing of some essential

5

Jan. 2, 42, p. 2; Jan. 30, 42, p.
43, p. 4; Sep. 11, 43, p. 2.

1;

Feb. 27, 41, p.

6

Aug. 7, 42, p. 15; Nov. 13, 43, p. 12; Jan. 14, 44,
Don
conditions of wartime labor, see Richard Lingemann,
There's a War On? New York 1970, ch. V.

1;

On
9.
You Know

p.
t

Sep.

25,
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products were approved and considered effective by the
AUFBAU.
bonds, as the paper explained at one point, formed

a

War

useful device to

drain off excess consumer power, the root of many problems in the

wartime economy.

7

Problems relating to shortages of goods were of interest to the
readers.

Because the women were seen as the main shoppers, most advice

relating to economical budget management appeared on the women's page.

Usually these features about what to buy and when, how to save scarce
materials and goods, and how to become more self sufficient even in
an urban environment were informative and precise.

They paint an

excellent picture of the everyday lifestyle of many refugee households
during the war.

The sudden consumer orientation of the AUFBAU was not

very different from what happened in American women's magazines at the
8

same time.
In the spotlight of the reports on refugees in the war effort were

those immigrants who most directly contributed to defeating the fascists,

refugees in the American armed forces.

After Pearl Harbor, statements

in the AUFBAU gave the impression of a sudden rush of recent immigrants

from Germany to enlist in the armed forces.

vation is hard to check.

The accuracy of this obser-

A special desire to take an active part in

the war against the Nazis, as well as the benefits that army enlistment

brought for the refugees (they automatically became citizens after
enlistment.
serving three months) could have been strong forces motivating

7

May 22, 42, p.

8

0ct

.

43, p. 12;

24;

May 29, 42, p.

9, 42, p. 21; Oct.
Sep. 11, 42, p. 4;

16;

July 31, 42, p. 31; Oct

9,

42, p.

March 16,
23, 42, p. 21; Nov. 6, 42, p. 21;
Dec. 11, 42, p. 16.
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In any event,

the paper was extremely proud of the new GI s and
9
published
'

the names and photographs of the newly enlisted in
every issue.

Later,

notable events and observations about and by refugee soldiers were
regularly printed on

special page ("This is the Army ").

a

Life as a soldier was usually seen as

Americanizing experience.

a

highly rewarding and very

Mothers were assured many times that their

sons were well taken care of in the armed forces, and emphasis was

placed on the fact that life in the United States army had little in
common with the repressive rule under which German soldiers had

traditionally lived.

Comradeship,

a

friendly atmosphere, and

a

sober

attitude towards the war were stressed as the special qualities of the

American armed forces.

Some of the articles written by refugee soldiers

themselves clearly showed not so much sobriety as vengeful emotions
10

towards the enemy, especially the Germans.
The refugee boys in the army were pampered by

a

special organization

founded by some New World Club women, the "Our Boys Club".

Its activities

consisted mainly of sending letters and packages to refugee GI's, many
of whom had no family in the United States.

On holidays and free

weekends, the New World Club entertained those who were stationed in the

New York area.

However marginal these activities seem today, they were

widely reported in the paper; the "Our Boys Club" even had its own page

9

March 27, 42,

p.

1;

Jan.

9,

42, j. 4; Aug. 6, 43, p. 16.

10

3;
Sep. 25, 43, p. 3; Jan. 30, 42, p. 1 & p. 15; Jan. 2, 42, p.
p.
June
42,
18,
May 15, 42, p. 5; May 29, 42, p. 9; June 5, 42, p. 9;
Aug. 20, 43, p. 1.

4;
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in the AUFBAU for most of the war years.

But not every refugee could join the armed forces.

Women soon

wanted to become members of the WACS or WAVES, which some were allowed
to do late in the war.

Refugees living in the New York area were urged

to join the Civil Defense; but this was not always easy to do.

The

roster of alien specialized personnel, a central clearing house for the

registration of alien professionals, encouraged AUFBAU readers to apply
for government service.

Doctors, only reluctantly taken by the armed

forces, were advised to move to the countryside in order to offset the
12

shortage of doctors there.
As far as volunteer work was concerned, the refugees made considerable effort to prove that they were well aware of their special
The New World Club's "Victory

responsibility to help win the war.

Volunteers" sold war bonds, the women's group knitted and sewed for
the army, special blood donation campaigns were organized, and, in

April 1942,

a

fundraising campaign was started to purchase

plane for the Air Force.

Within

a

fighter

a

year the AUFBAU and other refugee

organizations succeeded in raising the necessary amount, the plane was
14

"

purchased, named "Loyalty," and dedicated in March 1943.
The refugees'

''’’'"Starts

financial support of the war was also expressed in

July 31, 43, p. 10.

12

June 26, 42, p. 3; July 10, 43, p.
43, p. 28; Sep. 24, 43, p. 32.

3;

Jan. 27, 44, p.

Marchl3, 42, p.

9;

July 24, 42, p.

Apr. 3, 42, p. 2; Apr. 10, 42, p.
43, p. 1; March 26, 43, pp. 15/16.

1;

Oct. 9, 42, p.

13 Dec.l2, 41, p.
14

21;

5;

Aug. 13,

7.

5;

March 19,

^
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war bond purchases which the paper promoted with considerable
thunder.

Active participation in war bond campaigns as minutemen or minutewomen
was considered not only a patriotic duty but also an Americanizing

experience which would transmit the American patriotic spirit to the
refugees

.

For the refugees, the war on the homefront was not experienced very

differently than it was by most Americans.

But in some ways the AUFBAU's

perception of wartime reality was definitely influenced, even distorted,
by the special situation of the refugees in this war.

Thus the AUFBAU's

consciousness of what happened in Europe was extremely high and showed
in the overly frenzied attitude of many refugees who wanted to be more

patriotic than most Americans.

The AUFBAU's portrait of war events was

so gripping, and the fears of most refugees about a possible Nazi

victory so suffocating, that almost no quiet or private life seemed
permissible or realizable for refugees who wanted to settle down and

establish

a

new permanent existence.

The desire to organize one's own

life first had to be suspended for the duration of the war.

The paper

felt that if, for this one last time, everybody would forget about his

individual needs and would invest his energies in winning the war, then

America's future and that of the refugees would be secure.

^5

June 12, 42, pp. 3/4; June 26, 42, p.

7;

Nov. 13, 42, p. 20.
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CONCLUSION
The German-Jewish refugees of the 1930s
were certainly among the

most successful of all immigrant groups to come
to America.

Within one

generation they entered the American middle class, hardly
distinguishable
as a separate immigrant group.

One might ask: why this success story?

After all, the refugees, as others before them, had to begin completely
anew.

Indeed, reports in the AUFBAU as well as from various refugee

agencies suggest that, as

a

rule, the refugees had to start from the

very bottom of the social and economic ladder and work their way up
only gradually.

Yet, this impression is only part of the truth.

In

actuality, the refugees can be considered to have been one of the most

priviledged immigrant groups in American history.

newcomers were middle class and well educated.

Almost all of the

Coming from Germany,

they had lived in a country which was in many ways similar to the

American social and economic system.

Moreover, it can safely be assumed

that only the more flexible people, and those with foresight, personal

connections, and financial means, could effectively make use of the
limited ways to enter the United States.
or sponsors in the new country;

Many had friends, relatives,

and they had to pass the rigid screening

of United States consular officers abroad.

Thus a highly selected

group entered the country between 1933 and 1945.
The major difficulties the refugees encountered after their arrival
in the United States were the result of their priviledged past.

As most

of them had a highly qualified educational background, language barriers

would
and specialized skills were obstacles for their assimilation that

135

have been less had the new immigrants come from
ground.

a

working class back-

But, even if the period of initial adjustment
was longer and

more painful for middle class immigrants, once they
had learned English
and added American know-how to their original skills
they could join
the American middle class almost without difficulty.

Only the rather numerous intellectuals (teachers, scholars of the
humanities, scientists, and artists) followed

a

somewhat different

route from the main road of refugee assimilation.

Much of their success

and influence had rested on their earlier reputations.

internationally known as members of

a

They were

certain school of philosophy, or

of a field of the sciences, or simply as representatives of the German

intellectual community.

They were so deeply rooted in German cultural

soil that any Americanization was impossible.

More than for any other

refugees, their stay in America was merely an exile; and in fact many of

them returned to Germany or another European country after the war.

Middle class background alone is not sufficient explanation for
the swift and rather steady assimilation of the refugees.

example, did they never form

a

Why, for

cohesive ethnic community among them-

selves, as had practically all immigrant groups before them?

As

suggested earlier, the specific historical background of the Jews in

Germany and the circumstances of their emigration made it impossible
for them to perceive themselves as Germans and as Jews in any positive

terms.

They looked upon themselves much more as middle class immigrants

than in any ethnic terms.

Adherence to the language of their old home-

country, and strong religious affiliation, factors which could have
ethnic groups
impelled the refugees into close association with other

in
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American society, were of minor importance.

An accelerating factor in the integration of the refugees into
American society was the onset of World War II.

As with any boom,

the war economy integrated disadvantaged minorities at least
temporarily

into the labor force.

Poor whites, and Blacks, along with many

refugees, could easily find jobs and move onto the first step toward

respectable place in society.

a

Unlike some other groups, refugees were

able to turn this initial chance into a starting point from which they

would attain more permanent positions as wage earners.

Because of their

social and educational background they succeeded during the war in

changing their status from

a

needed group of workers to

a

wanted class

of immigrants.
The social integration of the refugees was expedited by the

psychological climate of the war.

The ideology of national unity, and

the abandonment of the individual approach to the "pursuit of happiness"
in favor of a patriotic collectivism, created a favorable situation for

the immigrants.

Anti-Semitism and anti-alienism were officially

denounced as un-patriotic

.

And cooperation with anti-fascist foreigners

was approved, providing the refugees with ample opportunity to prove
their loyalty to their new homecountry.

Last but not least, the fact that the refugees were considered to
be

a

special group of immigrants helped them in many ways.

The refugees

were the first immigrants in American history who received comprehensive
and systematic assistance by special refugee aid agencies.

Newcomers

professions, and
were given financial assistance, were trained for new

were resettled into different parts of the country.

The refugees
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approved the assimilation efforts of these agencies;
and the success of

resettlement and retraining was considerable, although
it varied

depending on the age, the sex, and the social background of
the immigrants.
Refugee allegiance to the social and economic system of their

new country was unconditional.

The immigrants from Germany believed

that America's social order provided everybody, most notably the new

immigrant, with an equal chance to reach
in society.

a

respected and secure position

If one was willing to start a new life, the American dream

could become a reality.

millionaire possible;

Not only was the rise from dishwasher to
but, even more important, the menial worker had

equal rights and an equal dignity with the millionaire.

Thus the

vision of an almost classless society in the United States emerged on
the pages of the AUFBAU, especially during the war years.

The war also made evident that the refugees' decided approval of
the American social order was not accompanied by an understanding of
the American political scene.

looked into.

The system was looked at, but never

But from what perspective could the refugees analyze

the American system?

Certainly their experiences in the Third Reich

and in the Weimar Republic provided no background on which to base their

political judgement.

which offered them

a

Nor did the refugees want to criticize

haven from persecution.

a

A basic fear and

country
a

nagging

inferiority complex, caused by their uncertain emotional and political

position in the new land, largely accounted for their one dimensional

view and lack of criticism.

Refugees had been an unwanted group of

immigrants throughout the thirties, and for some time their loud
drown
proclamations of allegiance to the United States could barely

.
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the noise of anti-Semites and nativists.

Some of the refugees' blurred perspectives
of American society

had their roots in misunderstanding of the
American social system
from the viewpoint of middle class Germans.

Thus the fact that ethnic

divisions cut deeply into American society, more so than
class lines,
was frequently overlooked by the AUFBAU
In other instances the European attitudes of the AUFBAU

'

s

readers

produced feelings of superiority toward some aspects of American life.
The German immigrants were often critical of American culture, the

American family order, life in small towns, and American education.

Many refugees could not reconcile themselves to such aspects of
American life as married women holding jobs, children staying in school
for the whole day, or old and young Americans considering comic strips
as part of their daily newspaper reading.

Could they ever get used to

this lifestyle, they asked themselves in the AUFBAU.

One famous

refugee, Theodor W. Adorno, expressed his feelings about this situation
in an anecdote:

I

still remember the shock that a housemaid, an

emigrant like ourselves, gave me during our first days in New York
when she, the daughter of

a

so-called good home, explained: "people in

my town used to go to the symphony, now they go to Radio City."
1

way did

I

want to be like her.

In no

The conflict between the ideals of the

upwardly mobile German bourgeois and their desire to be like the
Joneses remained largely unresolved within the first generation of new

^'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," Bernard
Bailyn and Donald Fleming, eds., The Intellectual Migration Cambridge,
,

.

1969, p. 338.

.
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immigrants
In this dilemma the AUFBAU played an
important role for the new

immigrants.

The paper reflected the refugees' perspectives
on American

life and reassured them that the problems they
had were common to many

other newcomers.

When difficulties seemed to be insurmountable to the

individual refugees, the paper, and especially the New
World Club,

proved helpful in many practical ways, giving information and assistance

concerning immigration, retraining, resettlement, and assimilation.
The AUFBAU also tried to lift the morale of its readers by printing

success stories of Americanized refugees, in order to reassure less

fortunate immigrants that the American dream was realizable.

An important function of the AUFBAU, then, was to provide
reassurance and stability.

It tried to soften the cultural shock of

the immigrants from Germany and help in concrete ways with their

economic readjustment.
a

For the refugees the AUFBAU was the surrogate for

cohesive ethnic community which they could not build in

sense.

a

more complete

This fact did not prevent the paper from truly serving the

Americanization of the immigrant.
indirect way.

But it did this only in a very

Neither the thunderous war patriotism nor the editorial

debates about Americanization helped the reader much.

But numerous

smaller, neutral looking features in the paper, such as the "Wall

Street Telegram" the "Review of Labor," and "Frau Marianne's" advice
about careful shopping, accurately reflected the facts of daily life in
the United States.

Through these minor features, the AUFBAU conveyed

the essential raw materials of acculturation.

In reality, Americanization

behind the
of the refugee occurred mostly in the background of the paper,
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official efforts toward that goal.

The AUFBAU did succeed remarkably

well in its primary goal of Americanization,
but the greatest part of
this success came through inadvertence.
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appendix
RULES FOR REFUGEES, ROYAL OR OTHERWISE, WHILE IN AMERICA

Refugees in America are on

a spot.

to take them in during their exile.

So are Americans who have volunteered

Hence to promote international good-

will LIFE offers a few simple rules of behavior for visiting foreigners,
royal or otherwise, who don't bother about becoming

a

part of the U.S.

scene:
1.

Refugees should remember that they are nothing special.

Broadly

speaking, all U. S. citizens except Indians, who do not count, are

either refugees or descendants of refugees.

Newcomers must take their

proper place.
2.

Refugees should not write articles about the Collapse of France

or My Escape from Europe, cash checks on non-existent bank accounts, get

drunk in public until they know English, or insult U.

S.

girls.

Some

American girls, unfortunately, are still susceptible to foreign accents.
3.

Refugee youngsters, like those of the domestic variety, should be

seen and not heard.

Small fry should work hard in school and not bother

their elders.
4.

Celebrated refugees must learn U. S. manners and customs.

They

should not suggest to natives that civilized people take three hours
such as only
for lunch, that what the U. S. needs is art and culture

know how to
Europeans can contribute, and that Americans do not really
live.

to
They should also hold their public lecturing down

minimum.

a subsistence
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5.

Rich refugees should not demand maid service, special cooking and

personal automobiles from hosts who feel they are doing handsomely to

provide their guests with room and board.

There are already along the

eastern seaboard of this country many refugees from refugees.
6.

Refugees should remember that Americans' nerves are on edge.

They

must not band together in little swarms, chattering and squealing in
their foreign bird-talk.

They must mingle, calmly and happily, with

all and sundry, staying outdoors as much as possible.
7.

At all costs, let those refugees and imitation refugees who insist

on sliding in the snow in Tyrolean costume stop yodeling.
8.

Above all, refugees should be aware that Americans feel friendly

toward them and in their own way are trying to give them

LIFE magazine, December 16, 1940, p. 91.

a

decent break.

